CAAT Publications - Arms Exports to Indonesia

Arms Exports to Indonesia

Written by Nicholas Gilby, © October 1999

Section II: UK EXPORTS AND POLICY

Section III: OTHER EXPORTING COUNTRIES

Conclusion

Notes

Acronyms

Since the mid-1970s the international community, in particular the West, has supplied large amounts of military equipment to Indonesia. This is despite the regime's denial of human rights in Indonesia during the past three decades, and its brutal invasion and occupation of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor in 1975.

The Labour government came to power in the UK pledging not to "permit the sale of arms to regimes that might use them for internal repression or international aggression," and to "spread the values of human rights, civil liberties and democracy which we demand for ourselves". The refusal of Labour to rescind arms exports licences to Indonesia, granted under the Conservatives, figures showing the number of arms export licences issued with respect to Indonesia, and Labour's admission that equipment exported has been used by Indonesia for internal security have brought the sincerity of Labour's policy into question. This briefing examines the Labour government's record on arms to Indonesia against its stated "ethical" objectives, particularly in the light of Indonesia's recent human rights record. Many other countries continue to export arms to Indonesia, and the arms trade to Indonesia is considered here in a broader international context.

Indonesia has undergone major changes since the end of 1996, the outcome of which are unclear. The four main events have been the fall of former President Suharto, the economic crisis (part of a wider economic malaise in South-east Asia), the recent Indonesian general and presidential elections, and the referendum on the future of East Timor and its aftermath. Suharto, an authoritarian right-wing dictator who had ruled Indonesia since 1965, was forced to resign in May 1998, his legitimacy destroyed in the eyes of sections of the ruling elite as well as the wider populace. Dr Habibie, his replacement, who had previously headed the military-industrial complex, presides over a regime that has made a few important changes. The widespread unrest during 1998 put great pressure on the Indonesian elite to liberalise, demonstrated in the decision to agree to a United Nations (UN)-supervised referendum over the future of East Timor. However, the military proceeded to arm pro-Indonesian militias with the intention of destabilising the referendum by terrorising the population. Having forced the UN to delay the referendum for several weeks because of worries over security, the refusal of the army and pro-Indonesian militias to accept the overwhelming vote in favour of independence resulted in the worst violence in East Timor for many years. The militias, abetted by the Indonesian military, carried out many atrocities against independence supporters, reducing East Timor to a state of anarchy, killing thousands and displacing the majority of the population from their homes. At present, the regime is still repressive, influenced by the military, and continues to commit atrocities in East Timor and Indonesia, as this briefing shows. This briefing looks at how far the changes and unrest in Indonesia may affect the arms trade in the future.

Until very recently, i.e. after Suharto's demise, the electoral system in Indonesia guaranteed victory to GOLKAR, the ruling party. GOLKAR was the only political party in Indonesia that was backed financially by local and national government, the civil servants organisation Korpri and the Ministry of Information. It was the only party allowed to campaign below district level. All of the three parties, GOLKAR, Muslim and PDI (Christian nationalist), were required to support the government programme and Pancasila (the state ideology). The upper house had a built-in government majority (as half were Presidential appointees and most of the rest inevitably from GOLKAR), and elected the Vice-President and President. All electoral candidates were screened by military intelligence (for the 1997 General Election 257 out of 2293 candidates were failed¹ i.e. 11.2%), to ensure GOLKAR's political hegemony. Furthermore, during elections campaigning material was censored and permission was needed to hold public meetings. No rallies were allowed.² The government actively intimidated political opposition, such as PDI leader, Megawati Sukarnoputri. After the Indonesian regime had organised her ousting as PDI leader, it raided the PDI headquarters sparking violent rioting in Jakarta in July 1996.³

Nevertheless, under pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to curtail the extent of cronyism in Indonesian politics plus the mounting unrest, the new President Dr Habibie liberalised the system. There is now no restriction on the number of parties permitted to contest elections, and the number of military seats in the Indonesian lower house was cut from 75 to 38 out of 500. The upper house now includes all 500 lower house representatives, plus 135 provincial delegates and 65 from various "social institutions". The President can only remain in office for a maximum of two five-year terms. Freedom of expression during elections was granted. However, the military is still guaranteed seats at provincial, district and lower house level.

The military plays a hugely important role in Indonesian politics. Suharto (premier from 1965 to 1998) was himself an army general. The armed forces - ABRI (now called TNI after the police separated from the armed forces on 1st April 1999), has always had a dual function role ("dwi fungsi"), which is involvement in the political and social running of the state, and also to guard against external threats as well as internal dissent. Until recently the military could screen candidates for the "democratic" elections and the armed forces (ABRI) were allocated 75 seats, out of the 500 in the Indonesian lower house. Previously, the post of adjutant to Suharto has been a typical route to high command for young officers (e.g. General Wiranto, current TNI Commander-in-Chief). Currently the Ministries of Home Affairs, Defence and Information are held by military officers. The military could potentially hold more senior government posts after the October Presidential elections. At a meeting of the Indonesian Parliament on 21st September 1999, Akbar Tandjung, leader of GOLKAR, said he would recommend General Wiranto as the party's Vice-Presidential candidate, saying of Wiranto and Dr Habibie "they have co-operated well for a long time and, seen from other perspectives, such as relations between ... civilians and the military, they make a good pair".⁴ However, General Wiranto declined the invitation to be GOLKAR's Vice-Presidential candidate on 18th October 1999, two days before the election.⁵ The police, who played a political role in suppressing opposition to the government in the Suharto era were under ABRI control. Many administrative positions in rural areas are held by military officers, giving the government social control in the countryside.⁶ Recently the TNI decided to slash this layer of administration, forcing some 3000 active officers to choose between remaining in the TNI or the civilian administration. The extent to which this layer has maintained control in rural areas is suggested by the fact that preliminary election results show that most of GOLKAR's voters live in rural and remote areas.⁷

The economic interests of the most politically powerful in Indonesian society are vast. The Suharto family fortune has been estimated as US$15 billion.⁸ Profits from inward investments to the regime's supporters are substantial. Suharto's children made fortunes through monopolies in the distribution and importation of major commodities, and evading taxes. Suharto's eldest son was to receive 20% of the profits of a Thames Water deal worth £225 million, and 9% of the profits of a BP deal with P.T.Peni.⁹ Likewise, the Trafalgar House Construction company's venture in Indonesia was linked to Suharto's eldest daughter.¹⁰ Within Indonesia, the six Suharto children hold significant equity in at least 564 companies, and hundreds of firms overseas.¹¹ The Indonesian occupation of East Timor generated vast profits for top generals as they took control of the Timorese economy,¹² and the Suharto family on its own or through corporate entities controls nearly 40% of the province of East Timor.¹³ A recent World Bank internal document revealed the corruption which has led to the embezzling of vast loans meant for Indonesian development since 1967. One third of the loans, worth US$24 billion, intended for infrastructure projects connected to Suharto's family members, relatives, and business cronies disappeared into their pockets.¹⁴

Suharto's replacement, Dr Habibie, also had considerable economic interests promoted by the regime's policies (his family runs dozens of companies). For twenty-one years Dr Habibie has run IPTN (chaired by Suharto), the Indonesian aircraft manufacturer. Dr Habibie's company has greatly profited from his proximity to the centre of power and thus ABRI. In June 1997 it won the Indonesian air force contract for 16 NAS-332 Super Pumas, 10 NC-212 Aviocars, and the refurbishment of 11 SA 330 Puma helicopters.¹⁵ However, as a result of being seen as corrupt and erratic by the West, the IMF bailout conditions for Indonesia included the end of state funding of IPTN, although Suharto announced "private funding" would be used instead.¹⁶ This did not seem to affect its success – in April 1998 it had a healthy order book, with orders from Brunei, South Korea, Thailand and Malaysia.¹⁷ However, the severity of the economic problems caused the IPTN Chief Executive Hari Laksano to announce in February 1999 that the Indonesian military had cancelled all their contracts apart from the helicopter order for the Indonesian Navy due to lack of funds, although IPTN's export orders will be completed.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the order for the NAS-332 Super Pumas appears to be going ahead, although they will be delivered over a longer period than originally planned.¹⁹

Although Suharto's interests were being dismantled after his demise, the regime and its supporters have considerable personal interest in seeing inward investment continue (in May 1998 the UK had £3.4 billion invested in 31 projects²⁰). Likewise, UK companies have considerable interest in supporting the current regime given the privileged access they enjoy to a regime which will not only buy weapons from them to protect their investments in the region (e.g. Natuna) but will keep labour costs low by denying labour and human rights to ordinary Indonesians. UK companies take the view, as evidently do George Robertson, then Defence Secretary and Sir Ken Jackson of the Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union (AEEU), that it is commercially important for the UK not to upset Indonesia over arms. This is despite Ali Alatas, the Indonesian Foreign Minister saying in June 1997 that Indonesia would continue civil trade with Britain even if arms trading were restricted (the UK was at the time the second-largest foreign investor in Indonesia).²¹ In addition to this, the West and the UK in particular is heavily exposed financially in Indonesia. Indonesia at the end of 1998 owed Western banks £30.75 billion. UK banks HSBC, Standard Chartered, Schroders, NatWest and Barclays are large lenders to Indonesian companies. Indonesia also currently owes the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) £12.75 billion, and £13.5 billion to Western governments.²² The West thus has considerable interest in preserving Indonesian military strength to ensure Indonesian political security to guarantee their credit is repaid.

From early July 1997, the forces of global capital wreaked destruction on Indonesia, causing an abrupt end to the rapid economic development of Indonesia. Between early July 1997 and late January 1998 the rupiah lost 85% of its value against the US dollar and the Indonesian stock exchange index lost 50% of its value,²³ with inflation soaring to over 50%. Industrial development was abruptly stymied with 80 projects, including an airport, abandoned by January 1998²⁴ and the collapse of the US$2 million IPTN project to build a 130-seater jet, with which UK companies Lucas-Varity and GEC-Marconi were involved.²⁵ Output in 1998 declined by 16%.²⁶ Overnight Indonesia became a heavily indebted nation. Estimates put non-performing loans from domestic banks at more than 30% of GDP in Indonesia. To this must be added an overhang of unpayable external debt, estimated at US$22 billion.²⁷ Explanations of the problems have focused on either "crony capitalism", the increase in dissent and the regime's increasing difficulty in maintaining social conditions which had been conducive to rapid growth, or the destabilising effects of short-term capital inflows (in January 1998 US$40 billion of Indonesia's US$65 billion private sector debt was short-term²⁸). The consequences of this crisis were severe and the burden placed on Indonesia's most vulnerable. Since mid-1997, Indonesia's annual per capita income has plunged from US$1200 to US$400.²⁹ In 1996 some 4.5 million people were already unemployed, but due to the effects of the crisis, official estimates suggest an additional ten million had lost their jobs by early 1999. Droughts and food shortages became common especially in rural areas, and inflation coupled with government spending cuts created considerable hardship. Absolute poverty which had been declining since 1966 was on the increase; at the end of 1998 the number of people living under the poverty line had risen to 118.5 million from 22.5 million (or from 11.2% of the population to 60.6%).³⁰ To date, the crisis is still severe and shows little sign of abating.

Initial attempts to mitigate the crisis failed. The IMF bailed out Indonesia to the tune of US$43 billion, insisting on a stringent programme of economic reforms such as cutting government food and fuel subsidies, causing further unrest. In May 1998 the IMF had to modify its terms to take account of Indonesia's political and social fragility. Despite this, the IMF has an effective veto over Indonesia's economic policy. The IMF's First Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer recently warned Dr Habibie and the five main parties in Indonesia that any major departure from the IMF programme could slow release of the bail-out money.³¹ This warning seems to have been taken seriously; one of Megawati Sukarnoputri's economic advisers, Laksamana Sukardi said "we will not depart from the IMF programme because we don't have a choice".³² Whilst this is the case, the chances of any significant recovery in Indonesia's economic fortunes in the near future must be small.

The effect of this on arms sales to Indonesia has been twofold. Indonesia has little indigenous military industry and thus needs to import almost all of its weaponry. Currency depreciation plus IMF imposed budget cuts have reduced its ability to do so. This is particularly apparent considering that total Indonesian imports from the UK fell by 50.3% in the first quarter of 1998.³³

The Indonesian military budget has been severely cut as a result of the crisis, but most of the reduction in expenditure can probably be explained by the arms imports moratorium rather than a significant cut in either manpower or combat readiness. In 1996 Indonesia spent US$4.7 billion on their military, in 1997 US$4.8 billion, and was projected to spend US$1.7 billion in 1998. The rupiah figures show an increase in spending from Rp11 trillion in 1996 to Rp20 trillion in 1998, suggesting the change in spending will almost exclusively focus on imports.³⁴ Although there has been a moratorium on arms purchases, five Indonesian private companies have been illegally importing hundreds of firearms, gas and electric shock weapons, according to the Chief Spokesman of the State Police Headquarters.³⁵

Unsurprisingly, given its built-in superiority in the Indonesian polity, GOLKAR won the General Election in 1997, achieving a record 74% of the vote.³⁶ Soon afterwards Suharto tightened his grip by reshuffling the ABRI high command to promote officers all recognised as being close to him. The Army Chief of Staff General Raden Hartano became Minister of Information, his former post being occupied by General Wiranto (former commanding officer of KOSTRAD – the Indonesian Army strategic reserve). The new KOSTRAD C.O. was General Sugiano, the former C.O. of the Presidential Security Unit. In February 1998 General Wiranto became ABRI Commander-in-Chief, whilst command of KOSTRAD was given to General Prabowo (Suharto's son-in-law), who became Indonesia's youngest three-star general aged 48.³⁷

In March 1998 the Indonesian upper house elected Suharto President for a seventh term and elected Dr Habibie as Vice-President. Despite Suharto's tightening of his power by favourable promotions and shielding the military from drastic cuts, he resigned from office on May 21st 1998, the end of a 33-year term of office. This was a result of Suharto's inability to contain the economic crisis which began in August 1997 and the consequent deepening unrest in Indonesia. This destroyed any legitimacy his rule had gained through Indonesia's rapid economic growth, which had, in any case, been distributed extremely unevenly, with vastly disproportionate gains made by the Jakarta-based elite. His cronyism was criticised by the thousands, largely students, who protested against him. This, and his age and length of tenure in office were factors leading to the speaker of Parliament, GOLKAR and the leader of the Muhamaddiyah movement (one of the biggest Islamic groups) calling on him to resign. It is important to be clear his ousting was not as a result of any democratic process, and although popular pressure played some part, it did not do so through any democratic political process.

Despite being seen by Western investors as interventionist and erratic on economics, Dr Habibie was immediately endorsed by General Wiranto and ABRI.³⁸ Whatever Indonesia's economic problems, in high politics, military backing is still the crucial determinant of a candidate's prospects for high office. Dr Habibie repaid General Wiranto's faith in him by appointing him Defence Minister in the new Cabinet announced in July 1998, as well as letting him retain his military Office. At the time General Wiranto was seen as more moderate than many of his military peers.³⁹ The crucial posts (given the nature of the regime) of Home Affairs and Information were also given to military officers.⁴⁰

Dr Habibie's government, under enormous domestic, economic and political pressure, decided to try to liberalise the regime. He announced a democratic general election for 7th June 1999, with the elections for President and Vice-President in the autumn of 1999. The process was assisted by large aid contributions from Australia, Japan and the European Union (EU) and US$50 million from the UN Development Fund. Forty-eight parties contested the elections. He also started negotiations over the future of East Timor. Indonesia and Portugal (the former colonial power) agreed on a plebiscite for East Timor, where its citizens had to choose between autonomy under Indonesian rule or full independence. However, UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan delayed the plebiscite for three weeks, citing security and logistical problems. The referendum eventually took place on 30th August 1999, having been originally scheduled for 8th August and then postponed until 21st August. As part of the liberalisation of Indonesia, Dr Habibie released political prisoners, although he took a gradual approach. In August 1998, 27 were freed, followed by 43 on 31st December 1998.⁴¹ Jose "Xanana" Gusmao, the East Timorese resistance leader, was freed on 7th September 1999 in the wake of fears for his safety in Indonesian custody, following the referendum result42 . Dr Habibie also cut military representation in government and downplayed the army's future role, claiming it should "not always [be] in the frontline of society"43 , although, since then, General Wiranto has called for a stronger military, saying "if democracy is strong but the law is weak, this country will become a wild place".⁴⁴

Megawati Sukarnoputri, seen as the leading contender in the Presidential elections (her party, PDI Perjuangan, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, had 153 seats and 34% of the vote after the general election, making it the largest party), did not seem to promise much improvement. Much of her support was due to her opposition to Suharto (which may have been motivated mainly by Suharto's overthrowing of her father in 1965), however, she had good links with the military and commanded support amongst many retired military officers. She favoured Indonesia being a unitary state and was opposed to independence in East Timor. Her party also rejected calls to eliminate the military's dual function in society, which has contributed to much of the human rights abuses in Indonesia.⁴⁵

Dr Habibie, however, was still tipped by many to be re-elected as President. There were rumours that GOLKAR were trying to ensure his re-election by buying votes.⁴⁶ A report by PriceWaterhouseCoopers into the Indonesian banking system found that $70million of the IMF's $43 billion bail-out package found its way into 100 bank accounts via a GOLKAR-linked company. The report found "numerous indicators of fraud ... undue preferential treatment, concealment, bribery and corruption".⁴⁷ The leader of GOLKAR, Akbar Tandjung, nominated General Wiranto as the party's Vice-Presidential candidate. However, against expectations, General Wiranto belatedly withdrew on 18th October 1999, shortly before Dr Habibie's performance report was rejected in the upper house by 355 votes to 322. All 11 political factions then announced they accepted the East Timorese vote for independence.⁴⁸ Subsequently, Dr Habibie pulled out of the Presidential election.

The leader of the National Awakening Party (PKB), Abdurrachman Wahid, having suddenly withdrawn his party's support from Megawati, was elected President on 20th October 1999 by 373 votes to 313 over Megawati. Wahid, or Gus Dur as he is also known, is linked to the Suharto family (having campaigned with Suharto's daughter in the 1997 elections) and has reportedly forged links with the military elite, including General Wiranto. He has pledged to implement the economic reforms required by the IMF. After Wahid's election, General Wiranto said he was willing to serve as Vice-President if accepted by the upper house.⁴⁹ However, he then decided against standing and the Vice-Presidency was won by Megawati.

The indigenous Indonesian military industry is very small and under-developed, given TNI's historical and current requirements, and is almost exclusively concentrated on small arms and aircraft. Indonesia produces the Belgian FN FNC 5.56mm and Italian BM 59 7.62mm rifles, the Italian Model 12 9mm sub-machine gun, and the Singaporese 40AGL 40mm grenade launcher.

Indonesia also makes several varieties of Western air transports. IPTN produce the Spanish CN-235, and Nurtanio produce the Spanish NC-212 and NC-235 aircraft. Indonesia also produces helicopters. Nurtanio produce the French NAS-332, the American Bell 412, and the German Bo-105.⁵⁰

Indonesia appears to be diversifying into naval equipment. In December 1997, the Indonesian Navy presented 2 home-made battleships to the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition in Malaysia. The ships are called KRI Pandrong-801 and KRI Singa-651.⁵¹

Indonesian military priorities presently appear to be focused on repressing the great unrest which seems to be spreading around the country. In a speech to the Indonesian parliament on 21st September 1999, Dr Habibie, fending off criticism of his handling of the East Timor crisis, said "I have done the best I could ... I have been able to prevent balkanisation".⁵² Prior to the economic crisis and the resulting unrest, Indonesia seemed concerned to upgrade its capability to maintain archipelagic integrity, particularly with their search for very modern air defence fighters and the upgrade of their naval capability.

In addition to the moratorium on arms purchases of January 1998, ABRI suffered cuts. These were mainly with regard to imports, though defence attachés, operational readiness training, ceremonies and co-operative exercises were also cut,⁵³ which were unlikely to greatly affect Indonesian military effectiveness given their current responsibilities repressing internal dissent. Despite these cuts in February 1998, two new organisations for combat training were set up to improve the quality of junior and mid-level officers.⁵⁴

Perhaps the most significant military development since Suharto's removal has been the announcement that the police are to be no longer under TNI's jurisdiction. Initially, the chief of national police will report to the Minister of Defence (the TNI Commander-in-Chief General Wiranto), and then probably the Minister of Home Affairs (currently held by a military officer). The change will be complete by 2001 and military ranks will be replaced by traditional police titles.⁵⁵ Given that police powers do not appear to be changing and the fact that they will still be reporting to military officers, this change appears to be more cosmetic than real.

The Indonesian regime has been willing to use its foreign-obtained weapons for repressive purposes, both against its own people and the East Timorese.

Intent

In public statements, the regime has made its intentions clear:

A multi-battalion counter-insurgency exercise was held near Timika, Irian Jaya, on 10th and 11th December 1996. Colonel de Wanna (the commanding officer of the exercise) admitted the exercise was explicitly designed to show the local population their capabilities.⁵⁶
In March 1997 General Tanjung announced his forces would shoot on sight any violators of electoral law.⁵⁷ The regime also used UK-made tanks for the purpose of keeping order.⁵⁸
In August 1997 Indonesia announced an increase in military spending in "anticipation of increased terrorist activities"⁵⁹ - the meaning of which can be deduced by:
General Tanjung stated in Jan 1998 that he was preparing for violence⁶⁰ because of the economic problems and said that any opposition to the government would be "sliced to pieces".⁶¹
In February 1999 a shoot-to-kill policy to quell civil disturbances was introduced by the ABRI Commander-in-Chief General Wiranto and was ratified by parliament.⁶²
Following this, on 22nd February 1999, the Indonesian chief of police, General Roesmanhadi declared police officers would be sacked if they defied any order from General Wiranto to shoot rioters and criminals on the spot.⁶³

Indonesia

Sadly, the Indonesian government has been keen to show that it is prepared to match its words with deeds in Indonesia (both under Suharto and Habibie):

In April 1998 during a demonstration in Medan, Sumatra, thousands of students were tear-gassed.⁶⁴
In 1998 Alvis tanks were used to suppress demonstrations in Jakarta. Specifically, on May 12th six students were killed and on November 13th twelve were killed.⁶⁵
During "Operasi Wimbawa '99", the purpose of which was to track down a Free Aceh Movement leader, the military killed 21 civilians in two separate incidents on the 3rd and 9th January 1999.⁶⁶
In early February 1999, 5 people were shot dead by police in Aceh as people listened to a speech by the Free Aceh movement in the village of Idi Cut. Police claimed only 2 deaths but admitted 51 arrests.⁶⁷
On 14th February, 1999, soldiers and police officers fired on warring Christians and Muslims on Haruku Island, 1400 miles north-east of Jakarta, as they refused to disperse when ordered. The government claimed 11 out of the 21 fatalities died from gunshot wounds, the Indonesian Communion of Churches put the death toll at 23. The Indonesians took advantage of General Wiranto's shoot-to-kill law ratified by parliament a week before.⁶⁸
At least 2 people died on the Indonesian island of Ambon after troops fired warning shots at clashing Christian and Muslim rioters in early March 1999.⁶⁹
During Dr Habibie's brief visit to Banda Aceh on 26th March 1999, tens of thousands of protesters calling for a referendum were confronted by troops with teargas and rubber bullets, who proceeded to wound more than a hundred people, many of them seriously.⁷⁰
In Aceh on 3rd May 1999, at least 38 protesters were killed by regular troops. The massacre, known as the "Dewantara Tragedy", took place near the city of Lhokseumave. Troops opened fire without warning on demonstrators, continuing to fire as they fled. Over 150 were seriously wounded. The government was unapologetic and broadcast film of the bloodbath across Indonesia.⁷¹
In June 1999, following a new Indonesian army crackdown in Aceh, at least 56 people were killed by the army in Beutong. Reports suggest over 200 were killed by the army in operations in Aceh.⁷² Following this there were reports TNI was to soften its tactics. General Wiranto ordered the withdrawal of anti-riot police and restricted army battalions to defending major industrial complexes. An amnesty was announced for all Aceh Merdeka insurgents and their supporters conditional upon their ceasefire and laying down of arms.⁷³ How long this will persist given previous Indonesian actions in Aceh is debatable.
Seven people died, including one policeman, during two days of rioting in Jakarta against a new security bill passed by parliament in September 1999. All the civilian casualties were killed by live ammunition.⁷⁴

There was much violence in Indonesia in late 1997 and 1998 (some estimates suggest 1200 died in May 1998 alone⁷⁵) due to the economic crisis. There are no doubt many more examples, but finding accurate information is difficult. Suffice to say these examples confirm the continuing brutality of the regime and thus suggests that many more died due to ABRI's actions and foreign-supplied weapons.

East Timor

During the years since 1975, the Indonesian military has carried out many atrocities in East Timor, most estimates putting the death toll resulting from the Indonesian invasion at 200,000 (approx. one-third of the population). These atrocities continued throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. In 1991 over 100 people died when Indonesian troops opened fire on demonstrators in the East Timorese capital Dili. Around the time Labour came to power atrocities were still occurring. On 23rd March 1997, 7 Timorese youths were killed and 42 wounded by security forces at the Mahkota Hotel in Dili, East Timor, as they tried to meet the UN special ambassador Jamsheed Marker.⁷⁶ The long-time Falintil guerrilla fighter David Alex was captured by Indonesian forces in late June 1997 and died in captivity the next day. ABRI claim that he died of gunshot wounds, others claim he was tortured.⁷⁷ During the first 8 months of 1998 there were 37 confirmed extra-judicial killings in East Timor.⁷⁸ It also came to light that British-made Saracen and Saladin armoured vehicles were being used in East Timor.⁷⁹ Both the Labour and Conservative governments had refused to revoke the licences for these vehicles.

Dr Habibie announced on 27th January 1999 that a referendum would be allowed in East Timor, enabling the population to choose between political autonomy within Indonesia or full independence.⁸⁰ The Indonesian military proceeded to arm pro-Jakarta civilians to create para-military groups to destabilise the country by a campaign of terror. In December 1998, Colonel Suratman (the Indonesian Commander-in-Chief in East Timor) wanted to arm 440 villages to "protect" them against pro-independence rebels.⁸¹ The pro-Indonesian East Timorese leader Domingo Soares, contrary to the military claim, denied having asked the Indonesians for arms.⁸² The military organisation of militias perpetrating human rights abuses in East Timor in 1998 was known of by the international community. The US Department of State noted the existence of paramilitary squads perpetrating human rights abuses in East Timor in 1998. It said "the Government ... also relied on bands of youths, organised and directed by the military, to intimidate and harass its opponents. Civilian paramilitary groups frequently were involved in human rights abuses".⁸³ The militias quickly started to regularly perpetrate atrocities. In January 1999, paramilitaries carried out killings in the village of Galitas in the Covalima district of East Timor. Eleven other villages were reportedly terrorised in a similar fashion.⁸⁴ The Indonesian army admitted arming paramilitary groups which killed civilians. Paramilitary commander Kansio Lopez, despite General Wiranto's denial that arms were being given to militias, stated that army equipment had been used by militias against a rebel outpost where six people were killed. An army spokesman said the militias were armed for "protecting people against the rebellion in East Timor".⁸⁵ Other massacres carried out by paramilitary militias occurred in Liquisa (6th April 1999) and Dili (17th April 1999).⁸⁶

Just over two weeks after the Dili massacre, the agreement between the UN, Indonesia and Portugal over the referendum was concluded in New York on 5th May 1999. Scandalously, the Indonesian security forces were left responsible for security, despite their arming and condoning of militia atrocities in the previous six months. The UN mission to East Timor comprised 1,040 people from 70 countries.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, violence in the period up to the referendum continued, with the UN delaying it from 8th August to 30th August for security reasons. Before the referendum it was estimated that paramilitary operations in East Timor killed hundreds of Timorese and forced 40,000 people to flee their villages in fear of violence.⁸⁸ Military involvement in the violence continued right up until referendum day. On the Tuesday before the ballot, the UN had the local army commander in Maliana replaced, after overwhelming evidence that he was orchestrating the violence there.⁸⁹ However, two were killed in Maliana on the following Friday, the UN blaming the Indonesian police for failing to control the militiamen.⁹⁰ The militia connection with the Indonesian military cannot be doubted. Joao Tavares, a militia chief in Maliana, was the local governor, a reward for leading a pro-Jakarta militia that fought beside ABRI during the 1975 invasion. He worked alongside Lieutenant-General Yunus Yosfiah (now Minister for Information), whose men killed 5 Western journalists in the invasion's aftermath. Tavares, speaking a few days before the referendum, said "if the vote is for independence, I can tell you there will be war".⁹¹

The referendum ballot took place on 30th August 1999. Incredibly, despite the militia intimidation, 98.6% of registered voters turned out. Out of the valid votes 94,388 (21.5%) backed autonomy within Indonesia and 344,500 (78.5%) favoured independence. Following the overwhelming vote for independence, there followed the worst violence seen in East Timor for many years. Independence supporters and UN staff (at least 4 were killed⁹²) suffered many atrocities. Dr Habibie's response was to sign an order imposing martial law in the territory, giving the military full control over the province.⁹³ The Indonesians reinforced their forces with troops from KOSTRAD (the elite strategic reserve).⁹⁴ The West was only then prepared to admit what it had known all along – that the Indonesian military were responsible for orchestrating the terror. President Clinton said "it is now clear that the Indonesian military is aiding and abetting the militia violence".⁹⁵ Belatedly, the Indonesians agreed to allow a multinational force into East Timor, although previously they had assured the international community that they could still ensure security. The scale of the violence in just a few weeks is both astounding and appalling. The UN estimates that 500,000 of the 890,000 population were displaced. 150,000 of these are being detained in Indonesian camps in Indonesian West Timor, whilst the rest went into hiding in East Timor.⁹⁶ Many have been killed.

For many years Indonesia's regime was based on an intermingling of military, economic and political interests. The military, led by Suharto, used Western anti-Communist fears and their desire to exploit Indonesian natural resources, to acquire weapons to maintain archipelagic integrity and secure the regime politically by using them against dissenters. The regime's denial of human and labour rights, and resulting wage suppression, created conditions conducive to inward investment. Much of the profits of this were used to greatly enrich the elite. The rapid industrialisation prompted by foreign investment created a veneer of legitimacy, however, this was destroyed by the financial crisis.

Since Suharto's fall, a section of the elite's interests are being dismantled (the source of Suharto's wealth was being "investigated" by Dr Habibie,⁹⁷ though after a year it was concluded as there was "insufficient evidence"⁹⁸ of corruption), for example Prabowo's meteoric rise had been halted. Dr Habibie needed to maintain Western goodwill for economic reasons, and seemed to be slowly liberalising (e.g. granting a referendum to East Timor and electoral law) against a background of great civil unrest. Given the vested interests he represents, and the interests of the West in having order maintained so the economy can be rescued and thus their credit repaid, the underlying necessity for Indonesia's elite to purchase foreign arms seems ever-present. Indonesia's military spending has declined in terms of foreign purchasing power, but TNI's current manpower, firepower and readiness looks to remain near, or at, past levels. The military seems to be retrenching, trying to preserve internal security at all costs, demonstrated by recent events in East Timor. Whether Indonesia will painfully liberalise, as many commentators seem to expect, or the military will cling on to power, is a question still to be answered - although, given the violence in East Timor and General Wiranto's political ambitions, it seems the military is digging in its heels more than ever. Nevertheless, given the increase in violence in Indonesia and the appalling actions of TNI in East Timor, the continuing vicious nature of the regime and their need to use resources in more productive ways, there is no excuse for any government to sell Indonesia any arms.

Equipment with a military use or with "dual" military/civil use needs a licence before it can be exported from the UK.

Policy under the Conservative government was drawn up within the parameters set out in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) document "Purpose of UK Arms Export Controls"⁹⁹ of 1996. This states in part a) that the government must adhere to the UK's international obligations which include:

A respect for human rights in the country of final destination (EU Common Criteria).
That the arms are not to be used other than for the legitimate defence and security needs of the recipient state (UN Security Council).
That the arms not be used for the violation or suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms, for the purposes of repression or other than for the legitimate defence needs of the recipient state (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe).

Part d) stated that part of the purpose of controls was "to avoid contributing to internal repression and instability", part f) "to avoid contributing to human rights abuses", and part g) "to avoid aggravating/prolonging existing armed conflicts".

The Major government's stated policy was, "We do not licence for export any UK defence equipment which we judge likely to be used for internal repression".¹⁰⁰ The Conservatives justified arms exports to Indonesia saying that none of the equipment was used in contravention of the above principles. They also repeatedly justified arms sales to Indonesia licenced by them by declaring a) not all countries had indigenous military industries and thus they had a legitimate right to buy arms for self-defence, b) the exports would reduce British manufacturing unit costs, therefore making purchases for the UK armed forces cheaper, and c) the threat to jobs if the volume of sales were scaled back.¹⁰¹

The incoming Labour government in May 1997 announced a change in foreign policy, declaring it would henceforth pay more attention to ethical considerations. Robin Cook, the new Foreign Secretary declared human rights would be at the "heart of British foreign policy," and said, "We will not permit the sale of arms to regimes that might use them for internal repression or international aggression. We shall spread the values of human rights, civil liberties and democracy which we demand for ourselves". The use of "might" was a significant tightening of export policy. Robin Cook in July 1997 said that he would "refuse to supply the equipment and weapons with which regimes deny the demands of their peoples for human rights." More specifically, he said this would "result in changes to the present policy governing the licensing of riot control vehicles, small arms and other equipment for sale to the security forces of certain regimes".¹⁰² In addition to these guidelines, Robin Cook made some specific statements about Indonesia. On the 29th August 1997 he laid out his policy objectives on Indonesia which were:¹⁰³

Strengthening the UK and Indonesia's commercial relationship, applauding UK export growth to the country and Indonesia's economic performance.
Improving the environment.
Improving human rights in Indonesia. He defended this on economic not ethical grounds, saying "civil liberty and open government are not the enemies of economic success but the conditions for economic competitiveness".

He thus proposed a six-point plan including open meetings with human rights leaders and lectures by British police on non-violent crowd control.

British Aerospace [top]

The UK has a long history of licensing the sale of British Aerospace (BAe) Hawk jets to Indonesia, beginning in 1978. On the 22nd November 1996, 16 Hawk-209 aircraft were licenced for export to Indonesia, the licence was to be valid for four years.¹⁰⁴ The Conservative government had judged that they were not "likely" to be used for internal repression by repeatedly stating that there was no evidence Hawks had ever been used against people in East Timor or Indonesia.¹⁰⁵

The licence was still outstanding when Labour came to power and at the time of writing the Hawks have started to be delivered. Given that government policy stated arms exports would be refused if they "might" be used for internal repression, there was pressure on the government to revoke the licence.¹⁰⁶

The purpose of Hawk aircraft and the Indonesian inventory

The Hawk aircraft licenced under the Conservatives in November 1996 are the Hawk-209 model. The purpose of the Hawk-209 is not in doubt. The manufacturers, BAe, describe it as a "single-seat, radar equipped, lightweight, multi-role combat aircraft, providing comprehensive air defence and ground attack capability".¹⁰⁷ The International Institute for Strategic Studies classifies it as "Fighter, Ground Attack", not as "Fighter".¹⁰⁸ Given that Indonesia in November 1996 was attempting to purchase US F-16 and Russian Su-30K aircraft (which are very modern air superiority fighters), and that the Indonesian force of ground attack aircraft was looking dated (consisting mainly of A-4 Skyhawks, Hawk-53s, Hawk-109s, and OV-10 Broncos¹⁰⁹), it is very likely the Indonesians bought the Hawk-209s to add more punch to their inventory of ground attack aircraft, not for air defence, the other possible use of the Hawks. However, as at present the F-16 deal is off the agenda (and has been for some time due to US reluctance to sell), and the Su-30K deal is dead due to the Indonesian financial crisis, the Indonesians may well, in future, opt to use the Hawk-209s in an air defence role as well.

Use of Hawks

With their ground attack capability, the Hawks could be used for internal repression and counter-insurgency exercises. Clearly any evidence that Hawks in the past had been used for "internal repression" would suggest that they "might" be used for such a purpose in the future. East Timorese leaders have frequently asserted that Hawks have been used in attacks on the East Timorese population since 1978.¹¹⁰ Robin Cook clearly at one point believed the same. In 1994, attacking the Conservative Trade Minister Richard Needham in the Commons he stated, "Hawk aircraft have been observed on bombing runs in East Timor in most years since 1984".¹¹¹

The Conservatives had claimed that there was no evidence that Hawks had in the past been used in such a role.¹¹² Labour in government agreed with the Conservative claims and said there was no satisfactory evidence Hawks had been used in East Timor.¹¹³ In October 1997 the new government broadened this statement declaring that having studied all available information they were confident that Hawks had not been used in East Timor or in a counter-insurgency role in Indonesia.¹¹⁴ The late Derek Fatchett (the Foreign Office Minister responsible for Indonesia) confirmed this in May 1998.¹¹⁵ However, General Wiranto admitted on 23rd July 1999, at Surabaya naval base, that Hawk fighters were flying over East Timor in routine reconnaissance exercises.¹¹⁶ The Indonesian ambassador to the UK claimed that the two flights on 16th July 1999 were providing general security.¹¹⁷ Initially, Robin Cook wrote to the Indonesian government voicing his concern,¹¹⁸ but was later forced to admit that Hawks are currently being used in East Timor. This was not sufficient to deter the Indonesians from using them on a regular basis for military operations in East Timor. An Indonesian air defence official in Jakarta said that Hawks were flying regularly over East Timor to detect any encroaching foreign aircraft. Three Hawks are currently based at the airport of Kupang, the capital of West Timor. The Foreign Office said it was "alarmed and dismayed" by the reports.¹¹⁹

Given the mass of anecdotal evidence that Hawks had been used for repression (which Robin Cook once believed), and that Cook now accepts that they are being used for military purposes, why is he prepared to sanction the export of these aircraft now? One is left to conclude that Labour's "ethical" policy is all talk. Clearly, the government does not feel that the financial returns for BAe shareholders are worth risking to ensure these Hawks will not be used to kill Indonesians and East Timorese. Coincidentally, Lord Hollick, a member of the board of British Aerospace, was also a DTI adviser at the time of the Labour decision not to rescind the licence.¹²⁰ The words of Sir Ken Jackson of the AEEU (a trade union which is a Labour Party donor) are perhaps more likely to represent the government's attitude. In September 1997 he said the loss of the Hawk deal would destroy the trust between Britain and Indonesia, with the potential loss of £1 billion of trade and the employment resulting from it.¹²¹

The situation at present

Until the situation in East Timor became desperate, the government made no attempt to revoke the Hawk licences, particularly as the Hawks were being delivered. Two Hawks (the first of the deliveries) from the 1996 deal were delivered on 21st April 1999, two on 11th May 1999, three on 3th August 1999,¹²² and three on 23th September 1999.¹²³ The sixteen were due to be delivered in the seven months after April 1999 (each one is worth approximately US$30 million).¹²⁴ They are (initially at least) to be based at Supadio Air Force Base near Pontianak, West Kalimantan to guard against threats to Indonesian security on the island of Borneo, the South China Sea and oil and gas interests.¹²⁵ They are also to ensure security in Kalimantan. An incidental side-effect of the deployment will be to protect Western economic interests in the region.¹²⁶ So far as we know, they are not planned to be used for internal repression, but given the Indonesian government's record since 1978 they "might" well be so used in the future. However, after the vicious repression of the East Timorese people by the Indonesian military and pro-Indonesian militias following the referendum vote in favour of independence, there was considerable pressure on Robin Cook to suspend or cancel further arms exports to Indonesia. On 11th September 1999 Cook announced the suspension of existing arms export licences to Indonesia and that the UK would press for an EU-wide ban on further arms sales to Indonesia¹²⁷ (although the EU Parliament has been calling for member states to "stop all military assistance and arms exports to Indonesia" since November 1994). This was to affect in particular the ongoing Hawk deliveries to Indonesia. Regrettably, the ban is only due to last four months (until 16th January 2000, with the licences validity extended afterwards by the period of the suspension – 123 days¹²⁸), so we can assume that, if the UN peacekeeping mission in East Timor goes relatively smoothly, normal service will be resumed for the Indonesians.

Farcically, it was revealed that three Hawk jets were in Bangkok, Thailand, en route to Indonesia at the time and could not be affected by the ban. The Indonesians stated that the delay in their reaching Indonesia had been due to pressure put on BAe by Robin Cook.¹²⁹ However, it transpired that the real reason was that one of the pilots delivering the aircraft had contracted diarrhoea in Bangkok.¹³⁰ The three Hawks arrived on 23rd September 1999.¹³¹

Recently, it has become apparent that the Indonesians are in fact returning some Hawks to the UK. They have decided that they do not require all 12 of their Hawk-53s and are to return 5 through BAe to the UK in exchange for spares. The RAF and DERA (Defence Evaluation and Research Agency) both have a shortfall and 2 have been returned already.¹³²

The UK government has assisted the deal by permitting BAe to use the DTI's Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) to guarantee the deal. In February 1998 Margaret Beckett, then President of the Board of Trade, stated that the 1996 Hawk deal had been guaranteed by the ECGD to the tune of £280m, which represented 87% of the value of ECGD support for military exports for Indonesia in 1995-6,¹³³ and 80% of the purchase price.¹³⁴ This sum had risen with interest to £362m in February 1998.¹³⁵ In September 1998 the Indonesian government, because of its financial problems, had to reschedule a portion of its debt relating to the UK.¹³⁶ The government and Indonesia renegotiated, as a result of which the Indonesians are to start payments again in 2000 and the delayed payments will be repaid from 2003.¹³⁷ The rescheduling agreement included principal instalments of US$167 million relating to the Hawk deal.¹³⁸

The taxpayer is paying for the training of the pilots of Hawk aircraft. By July 1998 the RAF had trained 5 instructors and 24 student pilots.¹³⁹ George Robertson confirmed later that two RAF loan service personnel had been assisting with the introduction into service of the Hawks from the 1993 deal, but had now left.¹⁴⁰ BAe have also agreed to provide training for Hawk pilots.¹⁴¹

Heckler & Koch [top]

Heckler & Koch is a subsidiary of BAe, having been taken over in 1991. The company manufactures the 9mm MP5 sub-machine gun, a weapon used by many military and police forces worldwide, capable of firing 800 rounds per minute. Indonesia has been described as "Heckler and Koch country", and the MP5 is used by Indonesian special units. In 1995 the Indonesian Marines were reported to be taking delivery of the MSG 90 sniper rifle.¹⁴²

British Aerospace transferred technology for Turkish production of Heckler & Koch weapons in 1998. The weapons are manufactured under licence in Turkey by Makina ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu (MKEK) near Ankara. The Turkish news agency Anadolu reported on 25th July 1998 that MKEK would export 500 MP5 sub-machine guns to Indonesia in1999. The weapons were to be exported to the Indonesian Police Department.¹⁴³ Given the brutal record of the Indonesian Special Forces and Police both before and after Labour came to power, it is scandalous that the government allows a UK company to produce small-arms in another country, which is then free to export them to Indonesia, bypassing any UK arms export controls.

Alvis [top]

On 9th December 1996, the Conservative President of the Board of Trade Ian Lang announced he had granted a licence for 50 Alvis Scorpion vehicles plus associated equipment.¹⁴⁴ The vehicles had 90mm guns and 2 machine-guns fitted as standard. The associated equipment included ammunition, radio equipment and spare parts.¹⁴⁵

Alvis vehicles are described as "easily adaptable to such varied roles as convoy escort, internal security or as a light tank".¹⁴⁶ Like the Hawks, the Alvis deal was not complete when Labour came to power, and like the Hawk deal, the new government decided to let the licences continue, despite its power to revoke them.

Given the nature of the Alvis vehicles and the Indonesian regime it would have been hard to deny that the vehicles "might" be used for internal repression. Unfortunately, there are many instances where they have been. Scorpion vehicles were used on a campus at the Islamic University of Indonesia at Ujung Padang, South Sulawesi in April 1996 against students protesting against bus fare increases and military brutality. Three students were killed and many more injured. The UK government acknowledged that Alvis armoured vehicles exported in the 1960s were used in the incident and that excessive force was applied in breach of Indonesian assurances.¹⁴⁷ This incident (though not the admission that Scorpions were used) happened before Ian Lang gave the go-ahead for the December 1996 licence.

Scorpion vehicles were also filmed being used during disturbances where protesters were killed e.g. on May 12th 1998 at Trisakti University in Jakarta and on 13th November 1998 in Jakarta.¹⁴⁸ Alvis-made vehicles have apparently been used in East Timor as well. Colonel Halim (the Indonesian embassy defence attaché in London) admitted on the "Mark Thomas" show¹⁴⁹ that Saracen and Saladin vehicles were deployed there, where Indonesia continues to use violence to deny human rights.

The £80 million December 1996 deal was crucial in propping up Alvis's profits. Alvis reported profits down 38% up to 31st March 1997 but were forecast to rise as a result of the deal.¹⁵⁰ The Labour government washes its hands of culpability in incidents involving Alvis vehicles on the grounds that such equipment was not licenced by them, yet refused to revoke the outstanding Alvis licence when it could have done, and had evidence they were being used for internal repression. The government has also supported the deal by allowing the ECGD to guarantee it. Alvis vehicles were covered by the ECGD to the tune of £65 million in 1996 and US$3.2 million in 1997.¹⁵¹ It is not known if the ECGD's guarantee for Alvis is included in the rescheduling agreement.

Land Rover [top]

In September 1998 the government supplied details of three arms export licences granted by the Conservatives to Land Rover in 1996-7, under the criteria ML6 and PL5031:¹⁵²

17th December 1996: 130 Defender 110 General Service Vehicles and 10 Defender 90 General Service Vehicles.
17th January 1997: 20 Defender 110 General Service Vehicles and 20 Defender 90 General Service Vehicles.
15th April 1997: 20 Defender 110 General Service Vehicles and 20 Defender 90 General Service Vehicles.

These vehicles can be used for cargo and troop carrying, towing and patrol roles.¹⁵³ The Labour government, as with all licences issued under the Conservatives, has failed to revoke them.

GKN [top]

Ian Lang also announced in December 1996 that he had issued a licence to Procurement Services International Ltd, for a variety of vehicles including seven Tactica water cannon. These are made by Glover Webb, a company that was bought by GKN in 1994. The associated equipment for the licence covered nearly 300 vehicles but no contract seems to have been agreed for their supply between PSI and Indonesia. Water cannon, which had ECGD cover,¹⁵⁴ were however supplied. Like the Hawk, Alvis, and Land Rover deals the Labour government refused to revoke the licence. Derek Fatchett announced that, after reviewing allegations, the evidence of Tactica water cannon being used for repressive purposes was inconclusive,¹⁵⁵ although allegations have been made about the use of such equipment to put down demonstrations in Bandung in June 1996, where dye was allegedly sprayed on students.¹⁵⁶

In May 1998, Kaman and GKN Westland were reported to be contestants to supply the Indonesians with shipborne anti-submarine helicopters for the Indonesian Navy's six Ahmad Yani frigates. GKN Westland were offering their Super Lynx 300 helicopter and apparently were looking to supply them after the crisis eased, hopefully around 2000-2001.¹⁵⁷ Perhaps this was the reason that HMS Richmond, in Jakarta in April 1997 on communications and practice approaches for replenishment at sea exercises, gave a demonstration of her Lynx helicopter as she left port?¹⁵⁸

Courtalds [top]

On the 26th September 1997 Robin Cook announced on the "Today" programme that he had blocked two arms contracts to Indonesia, apparently demonstrating that there was some substance to his ethical foreign policy. One of the contracts was with Courtalds Aerospace to provide six armoured Land Rovers for Indonesian police protection. The other was for the supply of sniper rifles. Together the value of the deals came to £1 million. While the cancellation of these contracts is welcome, it pales into insignificance compared with the value and lethality of weapons sold in other deals both before and after Labour came to power.

This minor concession to an "ethical" foreign policy was nevertheless overshadowed by rumours of Tony Blair's displeasure at Cook's action¹⁵⁹ Reportedly he wanted more attention paid to clearing the backlog of licence applications which had built up as a result of Labour's new policy¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, the doubts about Labour's real commitment surfaced in a leaked letter from George Robertson (the Defence Secretary) to Cook¹⁶¹ in which Robertson emphasised that in addition to the loss of an "£850K contract" for Courtalds, it could lose possible future business with Indonesia and that the commercial reprisals could be made against the UK. Shockingly, he painted KOPASSUS¹⁶² as merely a counter-terrorist organisation in the Western mould and described its now-disgraced commander General Prabowo as "enlightened".¹⁶³

GEC Marine [top]

GEC Marine talked to Indonesia about the possibility of supplying mini-submarines for special operations.¹⁶⁴

In July 1999 the Labour government stated that it had revoked no arms export licences to Indonesia since it had come to power up to 18th June 1999.¹⁶⁵ It is difficult for the government to justify any of the arms export licences referred to above on the grounds that there is no possibility for use of the equipment in internal repression. As the licences referred to above were in force when Labour came to power, and although they have been suspended for four months, this brings us to the question as to whether it would be legal for Labour to revoke arms export licences and whether, if it did, the government would be liable to pay compensation to UK manufacturers.

Article 7(1) of the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1994 states a licence "may be varied or revoked by the Secretary of State at any time". Assuming there is no guarantee in the licences about duration or compensation (it would be remarkable if there was), there would be no liability incurred by the government if it decided to revoke the Hawk licences. Justice Laws, in refusing a judicial review of the 1996 licences for Alvis and Tactica exports to Indonesia, said "the use of discretion will inevitably proceed with general foreign policy considerations in mind".¹⁶⁶ Given the announced change of policy under Labour to more emphasis on human rights, the licencees would be unreasonable to expect compensation. If the licencees did win a judicial review case over the matter, the court would have no power to order the government to compensate them. The Labour government is thus wrong when it claims that it would have to compensate manufacturers for revoked licences.¹⁶⁷ The precedents for revoking licences (Iraq, Somalia, and Yugoslavia) did not result in the government fearing compensation claims - the DTI said it would decide on a case by case basis, implying there was no legal redress for the licencees.¹⁶⁸ In fact, by agreeing to the EU arms export ban of four months (although the UK had been prepared to countenance an open-ended suspension), the government demonstrated that there were no legal obstacles to revoking or suspending export licences, as the Export of Goods (Control) Order stated. At the time of writing, the government had not stated it expected to compensate manufacturers for delays incurred by the suspension, nor had the companies concerned demanded any.

Derek Fatchett thus argued that revoking the licences is not "realistic or practical"¹⁶⁹ for the Labour government. This "spin" is used even by the Prime Minister. When the Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Guterres complained to Prime Minister Tony Blair that Labour was permitting the Hawk deal to be concluded, according to Guterres Blair said it was not "practical" for contracts signed under the previous administration to be rescinded.¹⁷⁰ Given that this essentially bureaucratic problem is presented as the only barrier to rescinding the licences, this is a pathetic excuse, serving little purpose except to camouflage Labour's real attitude, examined below.

The following two tables detail all the arms export licences in respect of Indonesia issued by the UK Government between 1994 and 1998. Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) allow shipments of specified goods to a specified consignee up to the quantity specified in the licence, for a specified period of time. Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) are specific to an individual exporter but cover multiple shipments of specified goods to specified destinations.¹⁷¹

Standard Individual Export Licences covering exports to Indonesia on the Military List issued by the UK Government from 1994 to the end of 1998:¹⁷²

Licence
Catagory

Description

94

95

96

97
Con

97
Lab

98

Lab
till
end
98

ML1

Small arms, machine guns and accesories

4(1)

4(2)

1(3)

0

0(3)

2(1)

2(4)

ML 2

Large calibre weapons, including howitzers, motors and flame-throwers

5(1)

2(1)

3

1

2

2

4

ML 3

Ammunition for ML1 ML2 and ML26

3(3)

3

1(1)

0

0

1

1

ML 4

Bombs, torpedaoes ,rockets ,missiles ,mines etc

3

1

0

0(1)

2

1

3

ML 5

Fire control and warning equipement

6(1)

4

1

2

1

1

2

ML 6

Military vehicles e.g. tanks and APCs.

4

13

9

4

0(1)

1

1(1)

ML7

Toxicological agents, riot control agents

1(1)

0

2

0

1

0

1

ML 8

Military explosives and propellants

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

ML 9

Combat vessels

4

0

1

0

0

1

1

ML 10

Aircraft and aircraft equipment

10

8

27

6

11

16

27

ML 11

Electronic equipment not specified not specified elsewhere,but not for military use

22

13

15

4

15

9

24

ML 13

Armoured or protective goods e.g helmets.

1

1

6

6

3

2

5

ML 14

Equipment for military training

4

4

3

0

2(1)

2

4(1)

ML 15

Military imaging equipment

2(1)

6

4

1

0

2

2

ML 18

Equipment and technology for productionof military goods

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

ML 21

Software for simulation and evaluation

0

0

0

0

0

2

2

ML 22

Technology for development and production

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

ML 24

Software for simulation and evalutation

0

1

3

1

0

0

0

PL 5002

Telescopic sights for firearms other that those included under ML5

0

1

0

0(1)

0

0

0

PL 5006

Explosive handling devices

1

2

2

0

0

2

2

PL 5017

Equipment for development of or use of military goods

0

0

1

0

0(1)

2

2(1)

PL 5018

Smooth-bore weapons, not in ML1

0(3)

0

0(1)

0

0

0

0

PL 5021

Ammunition, including projectiles

0(2)

0

0