South Africa

The 1999 deal

The government of South Africa¹ is currently purchasing warships and military aircraft to the value of $4.8 billion from UK and other European suppliers: from the UK, 24 BAE Systems Hawk trainer aircraft and 4 GKN Westland Super Lynx naval helicopters; from Sweden, 28 SAAB Gripen fighters, in which BAE Systems has a half share; from Germany, 3 submarines and 4 surface warships, variously described as corvettes and frigates; from Italy, 30 Agusta utility helicopters. A similar procurement package for the Army, including main battle tanks and hundreds of other armoured vehicles, has been deferred but is expected to go ahead before long.

Some of the usual objections to arms-trade activities do not apply here. South Africa is a democracy which is entitled to make its own choices and it is not at war or likely to be at war. Nevertheless there are grounds for deep concern about the transaction and especially about the UK's part in it. South Africa urgently needs to spend money on the development of civil industry, water supplies, education, housing and health, above all on mitigation of the catastrophe that is AIDS. On the other hand, it faces no military threat, and peace-keeping in Africa needs troops and light equipment, not warships, fighter planes and tanks. The sheer inappropriateness and expense of most of the purchases naturally led to allegations of corrupt inducements and the imprisonment of Tony Yengeni, the ANC's Chief Whip at the relevant time, for fraud.

The deal was not concluded until September 1999, after five years of anxious debate within the country and the government. The balance was eventually tipped in favour of the militarists by two factors: the easy financial terms which South Africa was able to negotiate in a global buyers' market (including UK Export Credits Guarantee Department loans) and the promise of 'offset' expenditures (counter-purchases and 'industrial participation') amounting, highly optimistically, to more than twice the value of the purchases.

The sellers

The vendor companies benefited from both the actual sales and the opportunity to gain effective control over the South African arms industry to help secure future business.

The vendor governments, especially that of the UK, did not merely help to lubricate the contracts but actively promoted them. South Africa's decision to rearm was in part the result of sustained external pressure, culminating in a visit by Tony Blair to Pretoria in January 1999 which is said to have clinched the deal. London's motives (and doubtless Berlin's and Rome's) were those which have so long sustained the arms export trade. The jobs argument, though carrying considerable public-relations weight, has little economic validity. More important is the deep-seated conviction that a flourishing arms industry is a badge of national status.

So the deal supports the mutual interests of the European and South African politico-military-industrial complexes. The real needs of the South African people do not figure.

DSEi

DSEi will play host to BAE Systems, SAAB, AgustaWestland and 36 South African companies. A South African delegation has been officially invited, as it was in 1999 and 2001.

1 Primarily sourced from Chris Wrigley, 'The South Africa deal: a case study in the arms trade', CAAT, June 2003