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Small Arms & Africa |
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Written by Margaret E O’Grady, © September 1999 Contents Introduction: the Small Arms Issue
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Small arms have recently received a great deal of attention as it has become apparent that, despite sophisticated military technology, these weapons have been the most lethal in post-cold war conflicts. Ninety percent of those killed in recent conflicts were civilians and 80-90% of those civilians were killed with small arms.4 In modern warfare, almost half of the casualties have been children, and children under the age of 15 have fought in 26 out of 33 of these conflicts.5 During the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were at the heart of the disarmament issue, but since these weapons are no longer perceived to pose the same threat, organisations have turned their attention to ‘light weapons’.6 Landmines were the first sub-category of light weapons to be targeted by campaigners and now much attention has turned to small arms. The campaign against landmines, which involved 1000 non-governmental organisations (NGOs), acted as a catalyst for those concerned with the small arms issue. The convention to ban the use of landmines was ratified in March 1999 and already has 132 signatories. However, campaigners recognise that the effort to monitor the influx of small arms into and within conflict areas needs to be much more specific than a campaign that sought to ban landmines outright. The landmine campaign had a more immediate appeal, as it was easier to gain support for a universal ban on weapons that kill indiscriminately. Many of those involved in efforts to monitor the trade in small arms specifically aim to ban arms exports to regions where human rights and/or humanitarian laws (governing the rules of war) are being violated.7 The trade in small arms has been a factor underpinning the destabilisation of entire regions and creating cultures of violence. Poverty coupled with the modern creation of the artificial nation state brought together diverse groups of people struggling under authoritarian regimes for scarce economic resources. Although the scarcity of economic resources and the repression of pluralistic democracies are the most salient factors of state fragility, the unrestrained flow of arms into such unstable states has fanned the flames of conflict and undermined development. If there is to be lasting peace in the developing world, there must be sustained interest in prevention and resolution of conflict both by those in the South, who tend to be the buyers, and by those in the North, who tend to be the sellers, of small arms. A commitment to conflict prevention and resolution is a commitment to development, which must encompass co-operation between those who create the demand for small arms and those who supply them. Ten countries accounted for almost 90 per cent of estimated world arms production in 1996. The three largest arms-producing countries (USA, UK and France) accounted for around two thirds and the US alone for roughly half of global arms production. The continued restructuring which has taken place since 1996 is likely to have raised the concentration even more by the year 1999.8 A willingness to respond to crises by halting arms flows to sensitive areas9 can be used as an indicator to determine which governments are truly committed to development. Since the majority of small arms used in recent conflicts have come from the North, the small arms issue provides the UK and other suppliers with an opportunity to prove it is not indifferent to how the lethal commerce in small arms devalues the lives of the world’s poorest people. The Cold War (that often turned hot in developing countries) ensured an unrestrained and continuous flow of light weapons from the US, the USSR, and other industrialised countries into developing countries. These weapons, which were sold cheaply or given away, served as a form of currency with which ideological allies could be bought. The origins of the massive arms surpluses in the developing world stem from the Cold War, from struggles to thwart colonialism and develop self-determination, and from advances in weapons technology that renders older weapons obsolete. The desire in the North to rid itself of this mass arms surplus has been the motive behind much of the unrestrained arms flows into unstable regions, despite a growing awareness of how the sheer quantity of light weapons in developing countries fuels conflict. Eastern European countries, such as Bulgaria, have cut back on military spending, and military hardware is being sold at knock-down prices. The widespread availability of small arms that can be assembled, carried and used even by small children has been a major factor in the increased use of children in combat. The arms trade to and within unstable regions is about supply and demand with no conscience. Chapter II of this study will examine the small arms issue in Africa and approaches being taken within Africa to address the issue. The new Labour government has made a commitment to "a more ethical foreign policy". Chapter III of this study will question whether this change in UK policy has actually taken place and will examine how the European Union (EU) Code of Conduct and other instruments leave loopholes for arms suppliers to circumvent the Code’s aims and are therefore unsatisfactory. Chapter III will pay particular attention to arms brokering, licensing and controlling end-use and how loopholes in European instruments affect the violent conflicts raging in Africa. Even if governments do adopt and enforce more satisfactory codes of conduct, enforcement on the supply side will not be enough to reduce the toll of civilian deaths. The massive international arms surplus increases the quantity of arms available on the world market at low prices. Low prices facilitate flows of arms into poor countries, especially those countries involved in violent conflict (where the demand is high). If and when conflicts simmer down or come to a stand-still, weapons are often not confiscated or are inadequately secured and therefore re-released on to regional markets at lower prices still. Small arms are often viewed as a potential sources of income by people who have limited access to material wealth. To add to the demand created by violent conflict, demand is further increased as civilians feel they need to arm themselves in self-defence. As long as conflict prevention and resolution in the South remain a low priority on the international agenda, developing countries will remain wide-open oysters for those involved in the small arms trade. Chapter IV of this study will examine the illicit side of the small arms trade and the links created by demand in the developing world, surplus in the post Cold-war era and a black market thriving out of control. Attempts to reduce demand, mop up surplus and control illegal transfers will also be considered. Chapters V, VI, and VII of this study will look more specifically at three conflict areas in Africa: the Great Lakes, Sierra Leone, and Angola respectively. These conflicts are similar in that they all involve insurgency groups that exploit natural resources to fund arms procurement. The case studies also provide clear examples of how the UK and other EU states have fuelled conflict by enforcing only loose restrictions on the trade in small arms both to and within Africa. The international community is already looking at how small arms fuel conflict around the world, but there is fear that not enough is being done on the ground to tackle the problem. NGOs and campaigners are building coalitions10 so that, as representatives of civil society, they can apply pressure on national governments, regional bodies and the international community to truly address the issue. Many NGOs are concerned that governments will only give lip service to the small arms issue, especially governments within states that manufacture the weapons. If the arms trade does become more transparent and subject to public scrutiny, the North will experience losses in revenue that would have been made from arms transfers. The central questions for those living in arms manufacturing countries such as the UK are: do the perceived economic benefits of the trade in small arms outweigh the costs of the conflicts fuelled and the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians, most of whom are women and children? And do we really want to live under governments that allow arms to flow into regions where children will use them? Chapter VIII will draw conclusions to many of the pressing questions presented by the trade in small arms. |
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Ninety percent of low-intensity wars in the 1990s are taking place in Africa and Africa has become the epicentre of intrastate conflict.11 Some of the largest states on the continent such as Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Angola, are involved in internal and/or regional conflicts. Furthermore, neighbouring states often become enmeshed in the conflicts of their neighbours. Zimbabwe, Namibia, Sudan, Angola, Chad12, Rwanda, and Uganda are involved in the conflict in the DRC. Burkinabes, Guineans, and Nigerians have played different roles in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts. And there is shadowy involvement of Zambians in the Angolan conflict. Economic interests seem to be the primary reason for African nations getting involved in each other’s conflicts. What makes matters worse is that a large percentage of the soldiers fighting these wars are children: more than 120,000 children under 18 are currently participating in conflicts in Africa.13 As desperate as tensions are in Africa, Africa’s development still seems to be the last priority on the international agenda. During the Cold War, authoritarian dictators or ‘strongmen’, who tended to quash any opposition, ruled many African states. Now that the Cold War is over, the US and other states in the North no longer need to protect their ideological/business interests by supporting the likes of Mobutu Sese Seko. Organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank are calling on developing countries to leave authoritarian regimes behind, implement structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and jump on the democratisation bandwagon. SAPs severely curtail government spending, often fuelling unrest in civil society; e.g., trade unions may go on strike because their salaries are not being adjusted to reflect inflation and cost of living increases. The private sector in African countries is usually small and not indigenous, so there are few opportunities outside the public sector for educated individuals. Many of the current conflicts in Africa are rooted in the poverty and/or feelings of disenfranchisement of groups that wish to challenge their marginalised status. Opposition groups have often opted for armed ‘solutions’ because, as aforementioned, arms are relatively inexpensive and readily available. In Uganda, an AK-47 automatic rifle can be bought for the price of a chicken and in Northern Kenya for the price of a goat.14 African states are now involved in a new scramble for access to natural resources in other African states at the expense of innocent civilians who might happen to live near these ‘strategic’ sites. Sites are seen as ‘strategic’ if insurgencies or governments are able to occupy the territory and plunder its natural resources (such as diamonds) to fund their war efforts. Minerals are often traded directly for arms or mercenary services to buyers and traders both from within and outside Africa. As commodities are usually the main exports in African countries, frequent and/or forced acquisition and exploitation of natural resources leaves little state revenue to be spent on providing basic services such as health and education to the civilian population. The use of mercenaries is no longer an immediate sign of direct foreign intervention, as governments in the North no longer have much interest in propping up African strongmen. It is now common practice for African governments and insurgency groups to hire mercenaries to protect strategic sites or to partake in active combat. Many African states are so weak that they opt to hire mercenaries to complement their military forces. South Africa’s ex-servicemen, who have fewer incentives to stay in the South African army15 after apartheid was abolished, have gone private and are now to be found wherever warring Africans have the natural resources to pay them. An embarrassed South African government banned mercenary activities last year and soon thereafter South Africa’s best known firm, Executive Outcomes (EO: set up by UK businessman, Tony Buckingham, and associates) "terminated" its operations. However, EO’s headquarters near Pretoria is still staffed; former EO personnel are still available for hire; and many former soldiers have recently turned up in Sierra Leone with a company called Lifeguard.16 Parts of Africa seem to face almost endless intrigue, destabilization and conflict, while the rest of the world appears to show only a passing interest. When told of the NATO response to the genocide in Kosovo, Paul Kagame, vice-president of Rwanda and the general who led the ousting of Rwanda’s former genocidal government, replied "it seems some people are more important than others." Kagame’s sarcasm is a response to the international community’s impotence during the Rwandan genocide of 1994 when 800,000 minority Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed. Africans have learnt that, when it comes to the international agenda, they are the last priority. On an international level, the UK, US, and France all have immense military and political power (both domestically and within the UN Security Council). It is irresponsible for these countries to resort to mercenaries and a covert foreign policy in Africa because they believe there would not be enough public support at home for peace missions in Africa. In this television age, when the effects of direct intervention are more visible, many leaders in the North felt intense shock and humiliation as they viewed dead US soldiers being dragged and paraded through the streets of Somalia in 1995. Certainly policy makers have been reluctant to get too involved in Africa’s ‘dirty work’ in The Great Lakes, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, and other African countries. Kagame is correct in asserting that the international community failed miserably to respond to the Rwandan genocide. Diplomatic solutions to African conflicts would be more plausible if there was a sustained interest in African affairs by governments in the North and their constituencies. Unfortunately, there is no such sustained interest and Africans have learnt the hard way that they are, more or less, on their own. African leaders have responded accordingly and have begun to rely more on their own resources; e.g., the Rwandan government has soldiers stationed in Masisi, in the eastern DRC to protect the Tutsis there (theBanyamulenge) from genocide.17 As there is a move to redefine development in terms of state security, many countries in the North have become involved in the dialogue. The hope is that this interest in security sector reform will soon be backed by support by the international community for African peace initiatives. Furthermore, there is hope that in a more secure Africa, donors will have more confidence in African development projects and will fund them accordingly. A secure Africa will be one in which there are alternatives to violence because governments and their security forces actually serve and protect their civilian populations. Contrary to some recent academic arguments, mercenaries can never be the purveyors of peace in Africa. Mercenary companies may be able to prop up a teetering government here or there, but their role as suppliers of military services and equipment has actually proven, again and again, to exacerbate instability in the long term. Many African leaders recognise that there are no quick fix solutions to establishing a lasting peace in Africa, and that, if they truly want to work toward development in Africa, they must develop strategies to tackle corruption. The international community should offer assistance to genuine African initiatives that would make the security sector more transparent and accountable to civil society. |
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Efforts have been made to stem the flow of small arms from Mozambique and Angola that are finding their way back into South Africa to fuel an already alarming crime rate. In November 1997 alone, 942 illicit firearms (a third of them AK-47s) and 272 explosive devices were seized by the South African police. Seventy percent of these were confiscated in the historically conflict-prone region of Kwa Zulu/Natal.18 Many of the weapons now arriving in South Africa from Mozambique and Angola were originally supplied to those counties by the apartheid forces. It is estimated that 80% of the small arms currently in Southern Africa have been there for 30 years. In an effort to reduce criminal activity and the trade in small arms in Southern Africa, foreign ministers from the South African Development Community (SADC) and the EU endorsed a South African Action Programme on small arms in November. The programme outlined four main areas for action: (1) tackling illicit arms trafficking; (2) strengthening controls on legally-held arms; (3) removing arms from society; and (4) increasing transparency, information exchange and regional consultation.19 There is also a West African initiative to reduce the amount of small arms in the region. The efforts now taking place on a regional level by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) evolved out of a pilot programme in Mali. In 1994, the Security-General of the United Nations dispatched an advisory mission to West Africa at Mali’s request. Ivor Fung, a West African who was part of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) mission, reported that one of its major findings was that there was no development in insecure environments: all development projects had halted in the northern part of Mali where warring factions were engaged in armed conflict. More than two hundred million dollars earmarked for development projects was frozen in Malian banks.20 Since the UNDP arrived in Mali in 1994, it has been working with Malians to define the root causes of the conflict, targeting security, development and societal needs.21 The disenfranchisement of the traditionally nomadic Tuaregs from the rest of Malian society is widely accepted as the root cause of the original rebellion and this factor must figure in a long-term solution for Mali. However, since the lack of security was seen to hamper development and threaten human life, it was the most immediate concern of the Malian people who wanted to disarm the warring factions. The proliferation of small arms was threatening the peace accord between the government and the Tuareg people. And, although the UNDP advocates security sector reform programmes that demobilise troops and reintegrate them back into society, as aforementioned, the funding for these programmes is still inadequate. The Malian government could not afford to implement a reform programme. Mali could, however, create a series of public events in an effort to consolidate peace. One event that has come to symbolise peacemaking involved the burning of 3,000 light weapons in a ‘Flame of Peace’ in the sand dunes outside Timbuktu.22 Weapons destruction, even in very impoverished regions of the world, is the best solution to the African weapons surplus. Buy-back schemes and amnesties do not go far enough in discouraging negative behaviour. As long as people feel the need to protect themselves, they will use money paid to them for their weapons to go out and buy better ones. The UNDP continued to work with Mali in the implementation of a ‘security first’ programme, which saw the reintegration of some 10,000 combatants into civil society, the destruction of the above mentioned weapons and the unlocking of over $200 million in development assistance. Since the programme has been implemented, a number of governments such as the UK, Norway and Canada have pledged their support to Mali.23 Ironically, Charles Taylor, who led the notoriously brutal and inhumane rebellion of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and who is now Liberia’s president, has been the most recent leader to initiate a public destruction of weapons surplus. The surplus had been created as a result of the end of the Liberian civil war three years ago that destabilised the entire West African sub-region. Millions of rounds of ammunition and at least 10,000 guns were destroyed at the end of July 1999. The weapons had been collected from the warring factions before the Liberian elections (two years ago). Many sceptics view the exercise as a public relations stunt by Taylor, who is known to be a clever demagogue. Indeed the ceremonies did draw international attention and were attended by regional heads of state and representatives from the international community. The Liberian government holds that it wanted to demonstrate how it has consigned to history a brutal decade-long war. Whatever the motives, Liberia’s weapons destruction was one of the world’s largest exercises of this nature. Moreover, there were enough weapons and ammunition to begin another war and the destruction of the weapons surplus will certainly not hurt Liberia’s prospects for stability and peace. Unfortunately, the exercise will have primarily only a symbolic value until Charles Taylor begins to act like a democratic president of a country at peace.24 Africans, as the consumers of weapons from the North, have the power to reject these weapons, even if they are cheap or free. Small arms will continue to flow into Africa, and circulate within Africa, as long as there is a flourishing demand for these weapons. If African states truly implement arms moratoriums on the continent, the demand for arms will eventually decrease. There is great doubt that SADC will follow the example of ECOWAS and call for a moratorium, as influential South Africa has its own arms industry and its economic interests outweigh its concern over violence in the region. However, it is encouraging that countries all over Africa are discussing the issue and considering what they might do together to control the arms surplus and its consequences. On 1 November 1998, at an ECOWAS summit in Abuja, Nigeria, Mali proposed a three-year moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of light weapons in the West-African sub-region. This effort to control the small arms surplus in the region was accepted by ECOWAS and, although the moratorium is not enforceable under international law, the international community has called on its member states to support the ban (UN Security Council Resolution 1209). The UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) has "pledged to support the implementation of the… moratorium"25. DfID has also acknowledged the relationship between arms supplies and conflict26 and identified security sector reform as a priority area of work27. In attempting to address these issues, Clare Short has emphasised the importance of working with other government initiatives, such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s programme of Assistance to Support Stability with In-Service Training (ASSIST) and the MoD’s Defence Diplomacy programme. However, as Susan Willett states in ‘The Arms Trade, Debt and Development’28, "[a] problem DfID is likely encounter… is that the coherence in international affairs so necessary to the success of security sector reform simply does not exist between or even within Whitehall departments". An obvious example of this lack of coherence is the contradiction between DfID’s concern to "reduce inappropriately high levels of military spending"29 and the promotion of arms sales in developing countries by the MoD’s Defence Export Services Organisation. |
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The UK and France hold on to about 10% each of world total arms production, second only to the US, which controls 50%.30 There are at least 120 companies in the UK involved in the trade of small arms and 71% of the weapons exported to Africa are procured by countries involved in political violence or high/low level conflict.31 Throughout the 80s and early 90s, the UK arms industry went to great lengths to promote the sale of arms, most notably exposed by the Scott Report and the Pergau Dam scandal. Oxfam notes how public funds earmarked for development appeared to be used as ‘sweetners’ to encourage foreign countries to ‘Buy British’ arms.32 This kind of contradictory foreign policy should not be tolerated and the two-year-old Labour government has promised to provide a "more ethical foreign policy." The trade in small arms must be made more transparent so that arms deals come under parliamentary and public scrutiny. Although the Labour government has recognised the flaws in its own arms monitoring system, there seems to be little change in export licences granted or small arms exported and information is still difficult to trace.33 UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook’s "more ethical foreign policy" did not seem to be in place when it was revealed that his government had broken the ban on military negotiations with Nigeria’s Abacha regime, which led the ECOMOG effort in Sierra Leone.34 The present system of licensing through the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) does not ensure effective controls on arms exports because the DTI’s primary aim is to promote, not control, UK exports. Sometimes small arms exports were not accounted for at all if they were sent in larger shipments of more advanced or ‘sophisticated’ equipment and excuses are made to conceal information; e.g., commercial confidentiality or the failing ECLIPS computer system.35 On July 1997, Robin Cook announced a new set of criteria for arms export licence applications. He made it clear that the government would not issue export licences for shipments that might be used for internal repression36 or external aggression, or that might undermine development projects. The government noted the importance of supporting an EU Code of Conduct so that stricter UK controls would not be undermined by foreign competitors supplying weapons where the UK refused to do so. In April 1999, the government released its first Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls, which covers export licence decisions issued between 2 May- 31 December 1997. However, despite the above steps, the Labour government continues to licence arms exports that fuel conflicts in the developing world. While the government writes in its Annual Report that all relevant individual export licence applications will be circulated to government offices other than the DTI (such as DfID), this qualified statement leaves room for the DTI to decide what is relevant. The commitment to producing reports is a move in the right direction; however, the report was produced retrospectively so, by the time it was published, it was too late for parliamentarians and the public to conduct debate as the decisions had already been made. Sweden has a system under which a parliamentary committee examines the ‘sensitive’ export applications in advance. The UK Annual Report reveals that the UK government approved arms exports to the African countries of Angola, Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone,37 Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. If the UK government honestly does not want to supply weapons where they might be used to fuel conflicts, undermine development projects, or violate human rights/humanitarian laws, it would have refused to export arms to all of these countries. The UK should support the UNDP call for an ‘Arms Free Zone’ in Africa. The Labour government either has little foresight about how the weapons that continue to be sent to unstable African states will fuel conflict, or it is not holding to its promise not to export to nations involved in internal conflict or with poor human rights records. In 1998, even with mounting pressure on the government to consider how its arms exports fuel conflict, the UK legally exported weapons to Angola, Namibia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.38 Although the UK had stopped exporting weapons directly to DRC, it may well have fuelled conflict by selling weapons to states that are not only engaged in internal conflict (Angola and Uganda), but are directly involved in the DRC conflict. A country that received 11 Standard Individual Export Licences and 10 Open Individual Export Licences was Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is leading the DRC war effort with an estimated 13,000 troops sent to fight against the rebels.39 Zimbabwe is involved in the DRC conflict against the wishes of the vast majority of the Zimbabwean people. The UK government could legitimately argue that licences were issued before October 1998, when Zimbabwe entered the DRC conflict; however, there have been no attempts to revoke the licences, despite the suffering that has come about as a result of Zimbabwe’s expenditure toward the DRC war cost.40 UK arms regulations continue to be extremely loose. Some of the major loopholes in UK legislation are:
The EU has worked on several different instruments to control the arms trade, notably The EU Code of Conduct on the Arms Trade, agreed by Foreign Ministers on 25 May 1998. The Code should go further in outlining the exact criteria governing where and under what conditions arms will be exported. Arms dealers are often able to falsify documents ensuring that the end user is a country with a relatively clean human rights record. The Code represents a first step towards the development of a common, responsible approach to arms exports by the EU Member States; however, it fails to provide full respect for international human rights and humanitarian law. Despite appeals from parliamentarians, NGOs, other pressure groups and individuals, EU controls are inadequate. Some of the loopholes in EU controls that could be used by arms dealers are:
These omissions will need to be rectified in the near future if the Code is to achieve its aims of high common standards in management of and restraint in conventional arms transfers.45 An International Code of Conduct would be a major step towards the effective enforcing of international human rights and humanitarian law, as it would create common criteria, applicable to all countries. International standards would make it more difficult for arms brokers to exploit ‘third countries’ that have loose export restrictions. It is clear that Eastern European countries, many of which have loose export restrictions, are important suppliers of small arms to Africa. Western European countries still have the opportunity to use these countries as ‘middle men’ or brokers, if they wish not to get their hands dirty. There needs to be tighter restrictions on brokering, so that dirty hands will be visible. If an International Code were to be enforced, one of the arms exporting countries’ major fears would be allayed; ie., the fear of undercutting by other countries (outside national or regional controls) whose profit incentives outweigh their concern for international human rights/humanitarian law. On 29 May 1997, 14 Nobel Laureates met in New York to launch their campaign for an International Code of Conduct. The Code, drafted by BASIC, Saferworld and the Arias Foundation, would require arms suppliers to certify that all arms recipients meet certain democracy and human rights standards. The Nobel Laureates encouraged the United Nations and individual governments to endorse the International Code. The Code stipulates that any country wishing to purchase arms must meet certain criteria, including the promotion of democracy, the protection of human rights, and transparency in military spending.46 The UN may have begun the process of internationalising codes of conduct in arms exporting by some of the resolutions it has recently drafted, notably the UNSC Resolution 1209: Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers agreed by the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council, 19 November, 1998. There has also been a call from campaigners to add small arms to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons which currently only covers major weapons systems. The UN has an important role to play in the establishment of international standards on the export of arms to countries who are violating international human rights or humanitarian law. |
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In March 1999, three Americans were stopped at customs with a truckload of guns at Harare Airport, Zimbabwe. The men were alleged to have smuggled the arms into Zimbabwe from the DRC and they were charged with possession of arms, terrorism, espionage and acts of sabotage. The FBI was not allowed entry into Zimbabwe to investigate because of Zimbabwean fears that the men may have been operating on behalf of the United States government as part of a plot to kill DRC’s President Kabila. The story was covered on BBC’s Africa News, but not on any of the major UK television stations. The men claimed they were missionaries, not mercenaries, and after some BBC reports on how the alleged arms smugglers’ lawyer condemned their torture while in custody, the story disappeared.47 A story such as this needs to be followed and kept in the public eye. Security companies and individuals that supply soldiers for hire are also known to negotiate shipments of small arms and other military equipment. The current international legislation on mercenaries is highly inadequate. Article 47 of the 1977 Additional Protocols (of the Geneva Convention); the UN International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries; and the Organisation of African Unity’s (OAU’s) Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa are all ineffective instruments. Drafters of international legal instruments such as Article 47 need to streamline the criteria for the identification of mercenaries as they operate on so many different levels. The UN and OAU Conventions only condemn companies and individuals that bear arms against recognised governments, therefore excluding any forces that may actually be hired by governments. The UN Convention has only 11 signatories and is therefore not even in force. Although mercenary assignments to help overthrow recognised governments are clearly not the only problem in Africa, if the UN Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries was enforced, states in the North would come under more pressure to define recent mercenary activity, amend relevant international mechanisms, and regulate mercenary activity. All national governments should identify security companies and individuals involved in mercenary activities based in their territory and should carefully monitor their movements. Unfortunately, the reverse is taking place: governments are frequently in cahoots with these companies. Representatives of mercenary companies such as Sandline have visited UK government offices and they are invited to US Defence Attaché Office meetings. However, the UK government is currently preparing a green (discussion) paper on controls on mercenary activities with a view to new legislation and has also tightened up its practices on links between government officials and private military companies. |
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An amendment to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child is currently being proposed. This amendment calls on member states to adopt the minimum age of 18 for military recruitment and participation in armed conflict. The UK has already ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, but is opposing the adoption of this amendment. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child currently has 13 ratifications and commitments from 10 other governments for speedy ratification. It is soon to become the first regional treaty to establish 18 as the minimum age of recruitment and participation in armed conflict. |
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The UN defines illicit trafficking in arms as, "that international trade in conventional arms which is contrary to the laws of states and/or international law."48 Some NGOs and other pressure groups have broadened the definition to encompass transfers of arms that contravene the stated position of the government in the transferring country. A broader definition that encompasses governments’ stated positions would help to increase public confidence. Lack of transparency is the key issue in tackling illicit arms transfers. Few governments have legal mechanisms in place to ensure that illicit arms transfers do not take place. In addition, as noted in the previous chapter, problems with brokering and licensing are endemic. This Chapter will examine the above and also factors such as surplus, which creates opportunities for illicit transfers. Government licensed transfers tend to cease when arms embargoes (or de facto embargoes) are imposed and the arms trade is forced underground. When the arms trade is forced underground, opportunities arise for smaller, private suppliers. For example, when an embargo was finally imposed against the former Rwandan government, the French government, then Rwanda’s major supplier, stopped selling weapons to the Rwandan government. However, French companies continued to supply weapons to the former Rwandan government and interahamwe in Zaire. When an illicit arms transfer is uncovered, it is often difficult to unravel the web that has been spun to try to disguise the crime in the first place. There are usually so many parties involved, and in many cases, so many men paid off (so much corruption), that in the end the plot is completely lost. Human Rights Watch is probably the organisation acting most effectively as the watchdog on illicit arms trafficking to Africa, but as Kathi Austin of the organisation’s Arms Project notes, "the field research required to expose the operations of private arms suppliers is risky, time consuming, and expensive"49. Even when Human Rights Watch uncovers incriminating evidence about private companies, unless the case can be decisively proved (which is not often with intricate, underground arms networks) it does not publish the evidence for fear of being sued on the basis of ‘plausible deniability’.50 Most illicit transfers that have been uncovered are referred to as alleged or probable. Those concerned with the issue are simply forced to accept that illicit transfers make up a major part of the overall trade in small arms, but since illicit trade works underground, like drug dealing, it is impossible to track how many arms have been traded this way. It is even impossible to estimate how many arms are currently present in Africa because of the prevalence of illicit arms dealing. Few countries have comprehensive legal regimes that provide deterrents for illegal arms trafficking. |
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Massive arms surpluses were created when the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO. Transfers of surplus weapons to Africa, particularly from Eastern Europe (notably countries of the former Soviet Union), have caused social havoc in Africa, as these transfers fan the flames of pre-existing conflicts.51 European surplus weapons are sold at (or even below) cost in Africa, which also drives down the prices of weapons already existing in Africa. The abundance and low prices of weapons in Africa create opportunities for those who wish to sell their goods locally on the thriving black-market, thus making these weapons accessible to an even wider range of people to use in violent repression, conflict, or criminal activity. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) calls for initiatives aimed at combatting the illicit arms trade on the regional and global levels.:
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The international arms flows into Africa have added to the many weapons already in Africa, some for 30 years or more. It has not been until recently that destruction of Africa’s surplus weapons has been considered by African leaders and the international community. In the past, the UN tended to stay clear of the security sector. Even now, change is coming slowly as security sector reform is incredibly costly. In the past, when weapons were confiscated after the end of a conflict, they were often stored somewhere where officials could steal and sell them. Some confiscated weapons never made it to storage spaces, but were immediately sold to the nearest ‘hot spot’ by officials. Many government officials are poorly paid and have large families. Corruption is rife in Africa and the temptation to steal and sell weapons is often too great. Weapons must be destroyed or there is a risk that they will find their way back into the market. The cultures of violence that have been created by the prevalence of arms in society have made some countries in Africa very difficult places to live. Currently Swaziland has the highest murder rate in the world. Parliamentarians have become targets for armed car hijackers as they often leave sessions late at night; therefore, ironically, those who could most help change the arms problem in Swaziland have begun carrying guns to protect themselves! Problems with gun running, especially in relation to cattle rustling, have become prevalent in countries such as Swaziland, Kenya, Somalia and the Sudan. The arms surplus has devastated communities and destroyed traditional ways of maintaining order and security. UNIDIR is trying to identify strategies that institutions and governments can use to counter illicit arms transfers. It recognises, in the case of small arms, that the great efforts now being put forth by NGOs and Inter-Governmental Organisations will be in vain if counter-traffic authorities do not receive adequate means to enforce the law. International legal mechanisms are helpful as ‘slip-ups’ usually become high profile media stories and governments do not want to embarrass themselves in front of the entire world. However, most illicit arms deals are so carefully orchestrated that they are not uncovered. There must be co-operation among different parties meant to implement legal controls, such as national police forces and intelligence services. Controls on illicit arms trafficking also needs to be enforced not only at the national level, but also at the regional level in terms of surveillance, tracking and intervention. The UNDP has some development projects in the security sector and is trying to emphasise security sector reform, but it has been slow in gaining economic support for security sector programmes; this does, however, seem to be changing. Any attempts made to deal with the small arms issue at the development level will also have to take into consideration the trauma endured by ex-combatants, many of them child soldiers who have lost their families. There have been efforts put forth since the cease-fire in Sierra Leone, to develop rehabilitation projects for ex-combatants. Insufficient development and justice are at the root of the small arms issue. All too often law enforcement officers and military personnel are underpaid, or not paid at all and end up using their weapons to terrorise civilians, often to sustain their basic needs. It is no secret that corruption is rife in the security sector in many developing countries. And who else has easier access to weapons that can be stolen and sold on the black market? Security forces must be impartial and free from corruption if they are to do their jobs and protect civil society. Police and military officers must be subject to civilian rule and be adequately paid if they are to provide protection to civil society. Crucial to the success of limiting arms sales and civilian deaths are development programmes that aim to demobilise the security sector, military personnel and ex-insurgency groups. And although attempts to reintegrate these ex-recruits back into society should be made wherever possible, training programmes and other methods of rehabilitation are expensive and many developing countries will not be able to support them without international support. |
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The Great Lakes region of Africa includes the countries of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and the DRC, formally Zaire. Each country has had its share of social, political and ethnic tensions, but conflict in the region is now concentrated in the DRC. Uganda and Rwanda are actively involved in the DRC conflict, and, therefore, the conflict needs to be analysed as a regional, as well as an intrastate conflict. Some argue that the added involvement of Zimbabwe, Angola, Sudan, Namibia and Chad has turned the DRC conflict into the first African continental conflict. The new pressure on Africa to solve its own problems, and the role Libya, Zambia and South Africa have sought to play as mediators, certainly demonstrates that there is continent wide concern about how the DRC conflict could have implications for all of Africa. The DRC conflict can be identified as regional conflict not only because three states from the Great Lakes region are directly involved, but also because the stage for the DRC conflict was set as a result of the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath. |
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Rwanda was a centralised kingdom before colonisation began. The country was and is extremely fertile and is densely populated primarily by two ethnic groups (Hutus 84%; Tutsis 15%).52 Although the relationship between Hutu farmer and Tutsi cattle-herder was never equal, years of Belgian colonial rule sharpened the tensions between Tutsi rulers and Hutu subjects. It was also within the paradigm of Belgian divide and rule that the concept of ‘ethnicity’ was developed. Henceforth, ethnic turmoil has been salient in the region and continues to act as a decisive factor in the DRC conflict. Upon independence from Belgium in 1959, pogroms against ethnic Tutsis began to occur in Rwanda, causing thousands of Tutsi refugees to flee to neighbouring countries.53 Refugees in the Tutsi diaspora joined together, especially in Uganda, where they were always identified as Rwandans (even though many of them were born and raised in Uganda). Many Tutsis fought with Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) and learnt from him how to be disciplined soldiers. Rwandan refugees who had fought with the NRA, split from the NRA to form the insurgency group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF was based in Uganda where in 1990 its military force, the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) began launching attacks into Rwanda. The Rwandan government’s response was to launch a campaign of ethnic hatred against Tutsi civilians in Rwanda, whom they called ‘cockroaches’. Newspapers and radio broadcasts emphasised the need to crush the cockroaches, who were all RPF collaborators, and massacres against the Tutsi population increased. Although the international community was supposedly supporting the Arusha peace talks that were taking place between the Habyarimana government and the RPF in Tanzania, during the civil war the Rwandan Army grew from 5,000 to 30,000 strong. Moreover, these 30,000 troops were heavily armed with a variety of new small arms, grenade launchers, landmines and mid to long range artillery.54 In the early 1990s, most of the significant arms flows to Rwanda came from Belgium. However, as the violence in Rwanda increased, Belgium outlawed shipments of lethal equipment. France went out of its way to fill the gap, especially after the 1990 RPF invasion from Uganda. Over $6 million worth of arms were transferred to the Rwandan government by France in 1991-1992. The French also provided military training and deployed French troops, ostensibly to protect French citizens. France’s nationalised bank, Credit Lyonnais, was allegedly the financial guarantor of a 1992 deal in which Egypt furnished the Rwandan government with $6 million worth of light weapons and ammunition. As the violence in Rwanda increased, Rwanda sought new sources of weapons such as South Africa, China and several states from the former Soviet Union.55 After the May 1994 UN arms embargo, the arms trade was driven underground. French arms transfers were diverted to Goma airport in Zaire (later renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and then taken across the border into Rwanda by members of the Zairian military. Five shipments of arms and ammunition were, reportedly, transported in this way in May and June of 1994.56 A UN Commission of Inquiry was later set up to investigate the allegations of illicit arms deals. It found evidence that a major French Bank, Banque Nationale de Paris, was involved in an arms deal between an ex-South African official and a Rwandan leader of the genocide, a violation of the UN arms embargo. Four years of civil war in Rwanda culminated in the 1994 genocide of 800,000 ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Two days after the genocide, the RPF seized power, and a million Hutu ‘refugees’ fled into the DRC (then Zaire). The UN set up camps for these ‘refugees’, but no effort was made to separate the ex-Rwandan army (FAR) and interahamwe57 militias from the other refugees, many of whom had been forced at gunpoint to join the mass exodus. As it was the French army who oversaw the transfer of the refugees to safety, it is possible that the French were trying to preserve the forces they saw as loyal to France. Prunier convincingly argues that French leaders believed they had to protect the francophone countries of Rwanda and Zaire from an Anglo-Saxon plot to wipe out French culture and tradition in the region (being carried out by Uganda and its American sponsors).58 A probable explanation for the lack of screening of the refugees is that it was considered to be far too dangerous, and UN observers were restricted from using force. However, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) mandate, it is supposed to provide assistance exclusively to refugees and fugitives fleeing criminal prosecution are explicitly disqualified from protection (my emphasis). Whether or not France held any sway within the UN Security Council, the protection of génocidaires by the international community was unacceptable. The interahamwe was able to build its arsenal from within the camps as aid agencies did not make information gathering a priority and consequently adopted normal protocol, which entails delegating power to ‘local leaders’. Unfortunately, the local leaders in the refugee camps in Goma and Ngara were corrupt ex-Rwandan army and militias guilty of genocide. A great deal of the one million US dollars spent every day by the international community to run the camps was squandered by these leaders who hoarded food, sold it cheaply in local markets and bought arms with the profits.59 The UN’s harbouring of the interahamwe in refugee camps, from which they launched massacres of the Tutsis in Northern Zaire (theBanyamulenge) well into 1996, in some way legitimised these groups. Moreover, even after a UN embargo was placed on the militias, little monitoring was being done to enforce the embargo. The UK NGO Oxfam, observed small arms arriving at the same airfields around Rwanda as the relief supplies for the refugees in the camps.60 Since the international community was indirectly facilitating the massacres, the Rwandese army decided to take matters into its own hands. The RPA sent troops into eastern Zaire not only to protect the Tutsis, but also to clear out the camps and send the refugees back to Rwanda. The RPA formed an alliance with a Zairian opposition group led by Laurent Desiré Kabila, a staunch Mobutu adversary, to become the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL), which was bolstered by Ugandan funds and equipment.61 The alliance between the RPA and Kabila probably developed under the condition that Kabila’s men would help the Rwandan army clear out the camps if the Rwandan army would stay on to help Kabila overthrow Mobutu. By the early summer 1996, the ADFL had successfully cleared out the refugee camps, sent the refugees back to Rwanda, and marched on Kinshasa to overthrow Mobutu. As the interahamwe militias and ex-FAR fled the camps, they often used innocent refugees as human shields until they had secured their escape. The genocidaires left behind documents that proved how the UK company, Mil-tec, was involved in sending arms to the genocidal former Rwandan government in contravention of the UN embargo. The former Rwandan government and its cohorts bought more than $5.5 million worth of machine guns, mortar grenades, ammunition and other military equipment from the Mil-tec Corporation, a small business based in Hove, East Sussex. Information disclosed to Oxfam while looking into the Mil-tec debacle suggested that other UK based or registered companies had been connected with the Mil-tec shipments. Orchid Aviation based in Gatwick, Peak Aviation based in Sussex, and overnight Cargo Airlines registered in Nigeria, but with offices in Newmarket, all seemed to have been involved. None of the companies resident in the UK were called to account, illustrating the weakness of the current export controls.62 There was also substantial evidence to support Human Rights Watch’s 1995 report, which accused France, China and (then) Zaire of supplying weapons to the former Rwandan government and the interahamwe. Kabila’s Failure to Satisfy his Rwandan and Ugandan Sponsors |
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Although the ousting of Mobutu from power was a good day for African politics, the euphoria soon wore thin as Kabila did not prove to be the leader many hoped he would be. Instead of following in the steps of Museveni of Uganda or Kagame of Rwanda who have tried to fight corruption and instil discipline into their armed forces, Kabila has followed in the steps of his predecessor, Mobutu. Kabila has attempted to consolidate his power by handing out patronage to his clan and using intrigue to play one country against the other. Ugandan president Museveni became particularly concerned with Kabila’s early dealings with the Sudanese government who support the Lord’s Resistance Army, currently involved in an active rebellion against the Ugandan government. When Kabila realised that Rwanda and Uganda might well withdraw their support and abandon him, he quickly turned to other countries who had commercial interests in the DRC and, on 2 August 1998, ordered the remaining Rwandan troops and military instructors out of the country. Kabila’s troops, under a former Lieutenant in Mobutu’s army, Jean-Pierre Ondekane, rebelled and, with the support of Rwandese troops, almost seized power from Kabila in Kinshasa. The coup attempt failed as it was attacked from behind by the Angolan Army. Those active in the rebellion retreated to the east. Kabila then went even further out of his way to switch allegiances by visiting some of the only remaining refugee camps in Congo-Brazzaville and striking a deal with the interahamwe commanders there: $150 for each recruit. The men were promised passage back to Rwanda if they would first join Kabila’s troops in the DRC. The men were first taken to Kinshasa where Kabila addressed them, and then on to the DRC’s second city, Lumbumbashi, for training.63 Kabila, who has no army of his own, has exploited the resentment and armed many local people in the eastern DRC who believe that the current conflict is not their war. Kabila has also struck deals with Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad and the Sudan, who all say they are involved to support the DRC’s sovereignty from the foreign Ugandan and Rwandan invaders. The reality is that all countries involved in the DRC have commercial interests there, in particular diamonds, gold and timber. Policy makers in Angola admit that their country is also involved because it believes that UNITA has struck a deal with the largest rebel group, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD).64 Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe apparently has substantial personal investments in the DRC, and some ana0lysts believe he has his troops in the DRC to protect his own bank account. Almost 50% of the DRC is now rebel held territory; however, Kinsasha still holds on to the key mineral reserves and is therefore more able to sustain its war effort. Currently thousands of refugees are flooding into Tanzania to escape infighting between Mai Mai militias and conflict between the two rebel factions of the RCD, Wamba dia Wamba (supported by Uganda) and Emile Ilunga (Supported by Rwanda). The Congolese Liberation Movement, led by John Pierre Bemba, controls the North East of the DRC. Peace negotiations taking place in Lusaka have been stalled because both factions want to be the one and only signatory of the peace accord. Although real efforts are being made to try to achieve peace in the DRC, there is still more work to do and the international community has a role to play. |
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It is no mistake that Burundi was not mentioned much in the preceding section on the DRC regional conflict. Burundi has enough internal strife to keep its diplomats and military strategists occupied. In Burundi, like in Rwanda, Belgian colonialism sharpened the concept of ‘ethnicity’ into an already feudalistic and unequal relationship between the Tutsi and Hutu social groups. Therefore, as in Rwanda, ethnic tension has been a salient factor in Burundi’s internal strife ever since independence, particularly as the main political parties in both countries have been allowed to form down ethnic lines. The key difference in the history of Rwanda and Burundi since independence is that the Hutus have held on to power in Rwanda (until recently) and the Tutsis have held on to power in Burundi. Both the Hutu ruling party in Rwanda and the Tutsi ruling party in Burundi, have used their power to launch pogroms on the opposition ethnic group. The Tutsi military government and bands of militias have killed thousands of civilians, often only because of they are Hutu; Hutu guerrillas have done much the same. This mass slaughter has caused the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians and hundreds of thousands have fled to neighbouring countries. The aforementioned immense and far-reaching Rwandan Tutsi diaspora is matched by a Burundian Hutu diaspora, and the most recent genocide in Rwanda now overshadows the genocide of 100,000 Hutus that took place in Burundi in 1972 and 1973. The most recent round of fighting in Burundi began over four years ago when Melchior Ndadye, the country’s first Hutu president, and many of his cabinet members, were murdered in the midst of a violent coup led by the predominantly Tutsi army. Majority Hutus began to kill minority Tutsis and then faced revenge killings by the army. A transitional government, made up of both Tutsis and Hutus, was formed in 1994 under Cyprien Ntariyamira who was then killed in a plane crash in Rwanda with then Rwandan president Habyarimana. Despite the genocide unleashed in neighbouring Rwanda, and continued violence within Burundi the Tutsi-Hutu coalition government managed to survive until July, 1996 when a military coup returned to power former Tutsi president, Pierre Buyoya. It was in the context of this latest coup that Burundi’s neighbours, led by former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, imposed a sweeping trade embargo against the nation’s military government. Peace-builders like Nyerere hoped the sanctions would prompt negotiations between the military regime and the Hutu insurgents. Regional sanctions on Burundi have prompted a de facto arms embargo on the country by the international community. Although little diplomatic progress has been made and inter-ethnic violence continues to plague Burundi, countries in the region permit their territories to be used to ship arms that further fuel the conflict within Burundi.65 Human Rights Watch uncovered business networks in the DRC, South Africa, and Angola that are exporting arms to Burundi. European companies continue to ship arms bound for Burundi. Some of those that Human Rights Watch identified as being involved in the regional trade have dual citizenship in a European and an African country. There has been much concern that there are still flows of arms and other military support coming in from Belgium which, despite its de facto embargo, is known to have failed to effectively enforce its ban on private sales. The port city of Ostend is a known hub for international arms trafficking to Burundi, mostly from Eastern Europe. Amnesty International accused the Burundian army of indiscriminate reprisal killings of civilians in its low level war against Hutu rebels. Amnesty has noted that Hutu rebels are doing much the same. These kinds of violations of human rights and humanitarian law are nothing new to Burundi. The international community and its member states should ensure that arms will not be exported to such a violent country. |
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The civil war in Sierra Leone, which erupted in 1991, has claimed more than 30,000 lives and displaced a quarter of the country’s 4.8 million population, according to aid agencies operating in the West African country. Half a million of Sierra Leone’s population has actually fled the country, turning Sierra Leonean refugees into Africa’s largest refugee population. According to the UNHCR, 75% of the refugees are women and children. The conflict is fuelled by diamond wealth and by a long-standing resentment among the people of the poor rural interior of the richer ruling class in the coastal capital, Freetown. Both the rebels and the pro-government self-defence militias, known as the Kamajors, have recruited child soldiers. Most atrocities directed against civilians have been perpetrated by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council/Revolutionary United Front (AFRC/RUF: AFRC is ex-Sierra Leonean army and the RUF is a rebel group). The RUF was set up by a former army corporal, Foday Sankoh, who formed an alliance with the Liberian militia, NPFL, led by Charles Taylor, now President of Liberia. The conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone are unlike many other conflicts in Africa as they were not theatres of the Cold War conflict; nor are they characterised in terms of struggles between competing cultures or religious ideologies. Analysts argue that these conflicts must be considered from a more exclusively African perspective, which might explain the lack of press attention.66 Political scientist Paul Richards explains: [The conflicts in both Liberia and Sierra Leone direct] attention to a new mix of factors linking wilderness, minerals and youth [and] make more sense when understood in terms of a complex, long-term, but largely local struggle to control clandestine wilderness economies based on diamonds, gold and forest resources…. [The conflicts] owe much of their impetus to attempts to dispossess a merchant diaspora that has controlled much of this wealth for two hundred years or more.67 Before the conflicts began in Liberia and Sierra Leone, natural resources in both countries were controlled by Guineans. Although this section will examine the events leading up to the current Sierra Leonean crisis, the reader should bear in mind that the Sierra Leonean civil war is closely linked to the Liberian civil war. The civil war in Liberia, which ended three years ago, has destabilised the entire West African region. Sankoh and other Sierra Leoneans fought alongside the NPFL during the Liberian civil war in exchange for promises of support when the time was ripe for the RUF to invade Sierra Leone. Charles Taylor, who led the NPFL and who is now is the president of Liberia, continues to play a pivotal role in the Sierra Leonean conflict.68 Rebel commander, Sam Bockarie, AKA Mosquito, has been spotted often in Monrovia and anyone looking for a peaceful solution in Sierra Leone knows that Charles Taylor must be involved. An initial alliance between radical ex-students (many under the influence of the Libyan Green Book) and a shadowy group of entrepreneurs eager to exploit natural resources in the region was likely to have been behind the crises in both countries.69 The methods used in both wars are also similar. Both struggles used Burkinabe mercenaries and, Richards explains, "(t)he main strategy of the two rebel movements…has been to seek to control these clandestine economies through exploiting a potential for youth violence behind the smokescreen of ethnic animosity."70 Prior to the rebel incursions, both Liberia and Sierra Leone had young labourers working in the forests and mines who were unhappy with the way in which they were treated by their sponsors and were already prone to violence. Rebel strategists seized the opportunity to exploit the labourers’ physical hardship and boosted their military potential with powerful new ingredients: cheap AK 47s, guerrilla training and ready access to confidence building drugs such as ‘crack’. It was from these sites in both countries that the rebels gained voluntary adhesion. Charles Taylor was also able to use the ethnic card to recruit youths for the civil war in Liberia, but it was more difficult to do so in Sierra Leone, and the RUF quickly turned to force to make progress against a largely indifferent, and often hostile, rural population. The RUF was also unable to rally the same kind of popular support as the NPFL in Liberia. Former Liberian President Doe was a far more violent and unpopular leader than Momoh was in Sierra Leone, and Liberia was far more centralised than broadly based Sierra Leone. As Richards notes, "(t)he forms of violence used (to coerce civilians) replicated a series of tricks apparently first used by RENAMO in Mozambique- e.g. bizarre public executions of respected authority figures in which potential conscripts are forced to take part."71 Sometimes youths are forced at gunpoint to kill their family members or local leaders. Many youths have been abducted by the RUF and school grounds have been used as RUF training centres. Young girls are also abducted and used as sex-slaves. Many youths fled to avoid recruitment. Sierra Leone had vast natural resources, and, as a small country with a correspondingly small population to support, it could have been one of the richest countries in Africa. However, like many other countries in Africa, its history is characterised by political instability and economic mismanagement. Sierra Leone, despite all its economic promise, has become one of the poorest countries in the world. It is a country constantly teetering on the edge of state collapse. Sierra Leone’s military has been particularly affected over the years by corruption and nepotism. The coup and counter coup in the sixties demonstrated the pivotal role the military could play, and leaders consequently began to recruit men from their own ethnic groups and political affiliations into the army. The use of favouritism in recruitment and promotion, rather than merit, inevitably affected the quality of the military and when the RUF launched a civil war against the government of President Joseph Momoh in 1991, the military was unable to adequately respond. The inadequate response was due not only to political fiddling in the military, but also because President Momoh had joined the ECOMOG peace-keeping mission and had sent a significant number of his troops off to fight in Liberia. In 1992, President Momoh was overthrown in a military coup by Valentine Strasser, who headed the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Allegations abounded that members of the NPRC and other senior army officers were involved in clandestine export of diamonds. Many soldiers were believed to be involved as well, trading their arms for diamonds. Soldiers were also alleged to be abandoning their military bases, so these areas could come under the control of the RUF. The civilian population, well aware of the connections between the military and the RUF, had lost all faith that the military would fight the rebels and stop the war and the terror that had become a way of life. Many segments of the population began to take matters into their own hands and formed civil defence forces, most notably the ‘Kamajors’. Strasser, who could not rely on his military, turned to mercenaries to provide quick fix state security. After a failed attempt to use the formerly UK Army Gurkhas,72 Strasser accepted an offer from Executive Outcomes (EO) to come and complement the national defence forces.73 EO went on the offensive against the rebels in return for $1.5 million a month from diamond mines in the Kono district. Captain Strasser was overthrown in a 1996 palace coup organised by his deputy, Maado Bio. Although Bio believed there had to be a more secure environment before he could step down, he was finally forced to concede to a popular election, and Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People’s Party was elected to power on 15 March, 1996.74 Kabbah was only in office for fourteen months when Major Johny Paul Koroma overthrew his government.75 The coup was unpopular both nationally and internationally. There was opposition to the coup from the civilian population of Sierra Leone and widespread strikes rendered the country ungovernable. The OAU, which is not known to react forcefully against military coups, immediately condemned the coup and appealed to ECOWAS to assist the people of Sierra Leone to restore constitutional order to the country. The Commonwealth (of which Sierra Leone is a member) also condemned the junta and asked that it return power to the elected government. The UN imposed an embargo on the junta. However, despite widespread opposition to the coup, no decisive action was taken to remove Koroma from power.76 Koroma’s first political decision was to invite the RUF to share power in the capital and Foday Sankoh was appointed vice-president. The alliance between the army and the RUF had finally been formalised. The Kamajors remained active and loyal to the ousted president, vowing to see his return to power. Kabbah, controversially, turned to Nigeria for support. Pressure remained on the junta to compromise and in October 1997, in Conakry, Guinea, at a meeting under the auspices of ECOWAS, the military agreed to hand over power to the elected government by April 1998. Disarmament and demobilisation of the RUF (supervised by ECOMOG) was also an important part of the agreement. However, not long after the agreement, the military put forward the argument that the disarmament issue did not arise since the RUF had been integrated into the national army. Furthermore, Koroma also objected to Nigeria’s dominance in ECOMOG and called for the release of Foday Sankoh as a condition for compliance with the Conakry agreement.77 ECOMOG lost patience with peaceful negotiations and as soon as they had a legitimate excuse78 to attack Freetown, they did so. Within three days Freetown had fallen. The soldiers and the RUF fled into the hinterland where they had to contend with the Kamajors. Although Nigeria carried out the military operation that ousted the army and the RUF from power, it is believed across West Africa that the Nigeria obtained prior consent from Western countries such as the UK and the US. Certainly there was a role played by UK registered mercenary companies, notably by London based Sandline International, in the coup that restored power to Kabbah. Analysts report the role of mercenaries in Sierra Leone in recent years has been so significant that Kabbah would never have been overthrown had he not initially terminated the EO contract. Kabbah decided while he was in exile in Guinea that if he wanted to regain power he needed to deal with the mercenaries. Rakesh Saxena, an Indian businessman with considerable mining, fishing and telecommunications interests in Sierra Leone, agreed to finance Kabbah’s return to power. Saxena met with Sandline, and arrangements were made to export arms to Sierra Leone. Arms reached Sierra Leone, despite the UN embargo. A recent report in The Sunday Times said that the same two UK companies that had been part of the operation that restored power to Kabbah, were recently involved in organising shipments of AK 47s and 60mm portable mortars to the RUF. The shipments from Slovakia, officially bound for Uganda, were reportedly diverted via Liberia and the Gambia to the rebels in Sierra Leone.79 In May 1999, President Kabbah released RUF leader Foday Sankoh from prison (where he was scheduled to be executed for treason) so he could begin peace talks with his commanders in Lomé, Togo. Kabbah later joined Sankoh in Lomé to sign a cease-fire agreement which took effect on 24 May 1999. The peace accord allows for the release of prisoners of war and civilians kidnapped by the rebels, along with aid agency access to desperate people on all sides. The meeting was facilitated by the current ECOWAS chairman, Togolese president, Gnassingbe Eyadema. The US Reverend Jesse Jackson’s presence and the presence of UN representatives, was symbolic of US and international concern, and therefore parties to the talks were said to have been on their best behaviour (as both sides, if in power, would later need to seek international assistance). Since the cease-fire has taken hold, aid agencies have been allowed access behind rebel lines. Enforcement of a continued cease-fire may be difficult due to the use militia forces on both sides over whom there are varying degrees of control. Both sides also employ mercenaries. The rebels have however been offered several cabinet posts and access to some mineral resources as part of a peace deal, which has now been signed. It certainly will not be the disenfranchised youth of Sierra Leone that inherit power, and many rebels will not surrender themselves and are demanding food aid. It is important that programmes are set up to address the needs of ex-RUF recruits if and when they surrender, or they will return to fighting as a means of survival. A comprehensive approach to establish peace should include rehabilitation for the disaffected youth of Sierra Leone. Currently, RUF soldiers are being asked to come out of the bush and there is a possibility that some may be incorporated into the Sierra Leonean army. The international community is helping Sierra Leone to set up rehabilitation centres so youths will have access to counselling and opportunities for education and employment. The Sierra Leonean government says it plans to destroy any arms surrendered by the former RUF rebels. Groups such as Human Rights Watch are furious that the RUF, which is responsible for so many killings and maimings, is being rewarded for its persistent terrorising of the population. Similar to the situation in Liberia where people were so desperate for peace that they voted Charles Taylor into power, so too the RUF seems to have terrorised the Sierra Leonean people into semi-compliance. Prospects for peace have been threatened yet further by recent developments. In July and August 1999, the AFRC took hostages in Sierra Leone and a relatively new rebel group [the Coalition Forces for the Liberation of Liberia (CFLL), based in Guinea] took hostages in Liberia.80The CFLL is made up of Liberian dissidents, many of whom were formally in the NPFL. Although seemingly active for some months, the CFLL is making itself known by increasing the severity of its attacks from Guinea into both rebel held territory in Sierra Leone and Liberia. There is still much work to do if there is to be a real and lasting peace in the West African sub-region. |
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Angola returned to all out war in December 1998, both President José Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) leader Dr Jonas Savimbi reneging on the Lusaka Peace Accord signed in Zambia in November 1994. The United Nations estimates that more than half a million people, 7% of Angola’s population, have been internally displaced as a result of the war. The use of child soldiers by both sides, which has always been a prominent factor in Angola’s war, is on the increase as both sides prepare for a major offensive that the government has planned for after the rainy season. The government has been busy procuring arms, mainly from Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia.81 An American living in Angola observed, "Angolans have given up hope for any peaceful solution and just feel lucky to be alive. The situation in Angola is ten times worse than what is happening in Kosovo, but Northerners in Angola are only concerned with access to oil and there has been no problem with that." Northern multi-national corporations (MNCs) have already reaped enormous rewards in Angola. The United States gets more of its oil from Angola than anywhere else in the world. UK companies also have vested interests in Angola. Arms suppliers in particular have done stupendous business in a country that has basically been at war for three decades. Oil and diamonds feed government and rebel demand for arms. UK and Belgian companies are alleged to have supplied arms to UNITA during the 90s in contravention of the UN embargo. The Angolan government was one of the recipients of UK arms between 2 May and 31 December 1997, according to the latest Annual Report and the Angolan government continues to receive UK arms. Angolan military leaders have regularly attended military exhibitions to view the latest weapons the UK military industry has on offer.82 Despite the evacuation of UN observers and various aid agencies from Angola, the UK government apparently does not recognise how its current relationship with the Angolan government serves to fuel conflict. The UN has tried to establish neutral humanitarian aid corridors, but the Angolan government has rejected the request. The need for neutral aid corridors is overwhelming as civilians get caught up in a game of Russian roulette. Civilians who happen to live in towns that come under siege by UNITA are afraid to leave their homes as they risk getting killed by shelling and gunning, yet they must finally risk leaving their homes so as not to starve to death. The town of Malanje has recently been under siege after UNITA captured the Capenda hydroelectric project, about 50 miles to the south-west. Civilians in Malanje, in their quest for survival, must travel to Luanda to sell their goods to make enough of profit to buy food. Many vans en route to Luanda have been attacked as security hardly exists, and it is common to see charred bodies on the roadside. There is very little news coverage of the violent attacks on transport as it has been said that the attacks are so commonplace that they are no longer ‘newsworthy’.83 In July 1999, more than 90 bullet-riddled and burned bodies were found in two mass graves. The government blamed the deaths on UNITA, but the region where the bodies were found was a UNITA stronghold. The MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) government signed the Lusaka Protocol when it was in a position of military strength, against the advice of its military commanders. When the government signed the protocol, it was under intense pressure from the international community, particularly the US, to do so. UNITA then seized the opportunity of the cease-fire to build its strength and shield itself from further territorial losses. Both sides rearmed during the relatively peaceful pause between November 1994 and December 1998. The government was allowed to rearm under the protocol, but a UN embargo on arms and fuel to UNITA remained in place. UNITA refused to transfer territory to the government and to demilitarise, both conditions of the protocol. And although UNITA initially handed over a fraction of its weapons to the UN, it probably did so to make it look like it was co-operating, so it could buy time to rearm and retrain. Like the RUF rebels in Sierra Leone, the UNITA rebels exploit the frustrations of desperation felt by disenfranchised rural youths who believe that the Angolan mesticos who are prominent in Luanda would put them to work on coffee plantations, given a chance.84 The UN helped to compound the problem by not enforcing the UN embargo and UNITA was able to procure arms through DRC and Congo-Brazzaville throughout 1996 and 1997.85 Also, despite UN sanctions, South African, Lebanese, Nigerian and Portuguese dealers flew into UNITA areas regularly to barter arms for diamonds. Weapons have also reportedly arrived from Eastern Europe through Uganda.86 Two groups of UN observers were supposed to have overseen the Lusaka Peace Accords, UNAVEMIII and its successor, MONUA, at the cost to the international community of US $1.5 billion. It was not until 1998, or after the war started again, that the UN began to target the direct and indirect export of diamonds as UNITA’s source of arms procurement.87 The UN’s mandate expired in February and its special envoy to Angola, Issa Diallo, left on 15 March.88 The UN stationed its observers in Luanda and elsewhere where it was considered safe; avoided UNITA strongholds; and thus ensured UNITA was able to retrain its military, despite the UN presence. UNITA initially refused to sign the Lusaka peace agreement because as it relinquished territory and arms, it would also be relinquishing a substantial amount of power. UNITA used its diamond wealth to procure arms during the Lusaka process (the export of diamonds netted the rebels US1.72 billion89) and is now in as strong a position as ever. The Angolan government lost its patience with UNITA and by mid-1998 was preparing for an all-out return to war. While UNITA used its diamond wealth to procure arms, the government used oil and has recently begun tying new investments in its oil sector to arms procurements and cash loans. The government hopes to pay off much of its current deficit, accrued primarily by financing the war, through the cash ‘signatory bonus operating payments’. These payments are to be made by international oil companies in exchange for operating in the ultra deep off-shore oil blocks: 31, 32 and 33. Foreign oil companies have been trying to finalise these negotiations for over a year as the oil blocks are thought to contain the largest untapped oil reserves being offered for exploration anywhere on earth.90 Oil industry sources expect these payments to be worth over $800 million.91 Luanda has already appointed the leading operator in each block: British Petroleum-Amoco will be the leading operator in Block 31 (26.6% in Block 31); Elf-Aquitaine (30% in Block 32); and Exxon (35% in Block 33).92 The interest of both oil and arms traders focuses on three companies: Pro-Dev, Falcon and Naphta, which have links to military and security specialists but little apparent expertise in upstream oil production. Swiss-based Pro-Dev has been awarded 15% stake in Elf’s Block 33, though only minimal public information is available about the company. Pro-Dev is owned by a Syrian businessman who has mediated substantial arms deals between British Aerospace (BAe) and several Middle Eastern governments. Industry sources told Africa Confidential that Pro-Dev has been offering similar services to the Angolan government and its equity share in Block 33 would be part of a medium-term payments guarantee structure. BAe categorically denies it has reached any arms supply agreement with Angola or that it has approached UK’s DTI about processing the appropriate export licences. However, a company spokesman did confirm that it was in purchase negotiations with South Africa’s Denel Corporation, the other company named in Pro-Dev’s procurement arrangement.93 Despite the decline in world oil prices, Angola has become one of the most attractive countries for oil companies. If the reader has lost the plot while reading the past two paragraphs, that is exactly the point of the arms trade: arms dealers weave intricate webs where connections can be identified, but very little can be unravelled completely. Business continues as usual for the big oil and diamond companies in Angola that employ hundreds of body guards armed to the teeth. And as SAPs were pushed through in the spring of 1999 in line with requests from the IMF and the World Bank, one might have thought that the stage was being set for the government to make gains in its recent offensive. But instead, UNITA forces are launching attacks closer and closer to Luanda and some diplomats have already being evacuated. The UN has also decided to send another mission back to Angola. The mission will be much smaller in scale this time: only 30 staff in Luanda. Kofi Annan is said to be unhappy about the limited response of the international community. The exodus of hungry villagers into Luanda and other urban centres continues. The UN World Food Programme has been working well below capacity in Luanda and other secondary cities. Huambo is one such urban centre where half of the 30,000 people now in the city have fled to escape UNITA shelling in the countryside. UNITA is now shelling Huambo! Many of those in Huambo are malnourished, some severely so, and are living off handouts from the United Nations World Food Programme. Reports of emaciated children are beginning to emerge from yet another African country. Both the UNITA rebels and the MPLA government are to blame for the Angolan crisis, but Western companies, a shadow economy, and the lack of international will also help to maintain the status quo of war in Angola. Corruption is rife among rebel leaders, army generals and government allies, who stuff themselves while the majority of Angolan people face famine. Both sides have to account for the thousands of lives lost in the war and for the billions of dollars squandered over the years from diamond and oil profits to procure arms and fund the war effort. In 1993 and 1994, imports of weapons by the Angolan government and by UNITA made Angola the largest importers in Sub-Saharan Africa. If the government was able to recover all the diamond and oil profits squandered by the Angolan government and UNITA and use them as revenue in Angola, the basic social rights of the Angolan people to health and education could be met. The Angolan government is loath to hear any suggestion of talks with UNITA for the third time this decade. Savimbi says he believes that there is no military solution to the conflict and that negotiations are necessary. However, unless he is able to gain a considerable amount of power, it seems he would only once again renege on any agreement. Possibly Savimbi is calling for negotiations now while UNITA is still in a position of power.94 The arms embargo on Angola currently only applies to UNITA. The Angolan government, which released its provisional budget in March, makes military spending a top priority. Arms procurement takes precedence over providing heath and education to the Angolan people. The UK and other Western states must reconsider their positions on Angola or prepare to be held accountable for their roles in the protracted Angolan conflict. |
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African states will be unable to develop until they achieve political stability. Political stability in Africa comes from a sense of well being; ie., being able to get help if one is sick, or being able graduate from secondary school or university into a salaried job. African governments cannot provide a sense of well being if they are squandering state resources to procure arms. There are two main approaches to tackling the small arms issue that have been examined in this study: 1) affecting policy directives aimed at establishing legislation that would control the supply of weapons in circulation: and 2) affecting the causes of weapons proliferation, or why there is such an overwhelming demand for these weapons. A holistic approach is required to change the patterns of instability and conflict that have been taking place in recent years. Recent conflicts have already claimed millions of lives and left millions as refugees or internally displaced peoples. Civilians have paid the highest price. The UK, the EU and the UN all have a role to play in changing patterns of instability and conflict at national, regional and international levels. The North must examine how its production and export of small arms have fuelled, prolonged and made conflict more lethal in the South. Africa, a region where 90% of low-intensity conflicts are fought, deserves special consideration in relation to the small arms issue. Political will seems to be the central problem with the implementation of arms controls, particularly with the major weapons-producing countries like the US, the UK, and France. Although there are significant differences between departments, the overall impression of the UK government’s actions is that it is doing the minimum required to try and keep pressure groups off its back. The production of the UK Annual Report was an important step, but it came very late and supplied little additional information to that already available. Increased transparency is urgently required, and not just retrospectively – both parliament and public should have the power to see proposed licences before they are granted. Licit arms continue to flow into Africa’s sensitive areas and the UK government continues to turn a blind eye to the way in which these weapons transfers wreak social havoc in the importing countries. Globalisation has increased competition, and arms brokering and licensed production are becoming greater problems as UK companies struggle for ways to circumvent national and regional controls and maintain their clientele. The DTI is not the correct location for regulating arms exports as its primary role is UK trade promotion. A specific independent UK government office should be established for the sole purpose of controlling arms transfers. The EU and the UN have an important role to play both in overseeing the adoption of regional and international Code of Conducts and supporting African states that wish to tackle the small arms issue. The EU should ensure that a licence to export arms that is denied in one EU country is automatically denied in all EU countries. The EU should also ensure that domestic controls in all EU countries are adequate. The UN should be promoting international Codes of Conduct and working to strengthen those that already exist. International aid donors have a role to play in weapons collection and destruction. Moreover, since psychological trauma has been and will continue to be one result of Africa’s protracted conflicts, the EU and UN should support programmes that aim to rehabilitate youths in African states. Many children have already lost their childhoods as a result of being forced to become child-soldiers or sex-slaves. Rehabilitative structures will need to be in place if long-term peaceful solutions are to be achieved. Africans must be the leaders in defining what the problems are on the continent and what can be done to solve them, but since the North has played such a large a role in creating Africa’s problems, Africa should not be left on its own to solve these problems. Africa is awash with small arms. Many states in the North, including the UK, continue to send arms to African countries where human rights or humanitarian laws are being violated. The UK and Northern states should support the UNDP’s call for an ‘Arms Free Zone’ in Africa and stop fuelling, prolonging and increasing the lethality of conflict in Africa. |
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Abdullah, Ibrahim & Patrick Muana,
"The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone: A Revolt of
the Lumpenproletariat", in Cristopher Clapham ed., African
Guerrillas, James Curry Ltd., Oxford: 1998.
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ADFL Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
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Campaign Against Arms Trade, 11 Goodwin St, Finsbury Park, London N4 3HQ
Tel: +44 (0)20 7281 0297 | Fax: +44 (0)20 7281 4369
Tel: +44 (0)20 7281 0297 | Fax: +44 (0)20 7281 4369
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