China: Arms Trading Under an Embargo

by Robin Oakley © October 2000

The temptation of the Chinese market

The Chinese market is potentially huge for UK industry and the military sector is no exception. With the Chinese military budget at a massive $14.6 billion (13.1% of its total government spending) and actual estimated spending as high as $38 billion there are enormous temptations to UK arms traders. Having witnessed the devastating effect of the technological superiority of NATO forces in (or over) Iraq and Kososvo, China’s already enormous appetite for high tech and modern weaponry has become insatiable. The UK government knows this and has been working hard to increase trade relations with China over the last three years.1

The UK’s elastic interpretation of the terms of the EU embargo has seriously eroded the purpose of the ban. The preparation of arms dealers for any further weakening of the embargo is obvious. Concilliatory statements, state visits and a soft line on Chinese human rights abuses are just part of the picture. The Chinese military have also been directly wooed by the UK government.

Looking away from human rights abuse and aggression

China is one of the worst human rights abusers in the world. They are pivotal to a region of extreme military tension involving nuclear states, illegally in occupation of Tibet and on the brink of conflict with Taiwan whom they have threatened to crush.

UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, former Trade Secretary Margaret Beckett and Foreign Secretary Robin Cook have all visited China to promote closer trade ties. Tony Blair’s personal visit was specifically to help secure several export deals, both civil and military, and involved high profile praise of the Chinese regime’s economic policies. Robin Cook hailed a ‘fresh start’ in relations between China and the UK. Unfortunately there has been no fresh start on human rights or conflcit resolution in China.2

Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited the UK in October 1999. Human Rights issues were not raised publicly by the government and the press were kept away from the Chinese delegation to avoid causing offence to them. Heavy handed police denied protesters their right to peaceful assembly and expression of their political views. Officers illegally seized Tibetan flags and other banners at human rights protests against the Chinese leader.3

China has been invited to UK government sponsored arms exhibitions, such as Defence Systems and Equipment International held in September 1999 and Farnborough International 2000. The UK government also encouraged UK companies to visit the International Defence Electronics Exhibition in Beijing in 1998.4 Further military ties have been made in the form of military training in UK colleges for Chinese security forces, at a cost to the UK taxpayer.5

The Chinese Defence Minister, General Chi Haotian, who commanded the troops in the Tiananmen Square massacre, visited the UK in January 2000 as the guest of the MoD. He met the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, and Geoffrey Hoon, the Secretary of State for Defence.6 In May, a Chinese military delegation of 70 visited the MoD in London and UK military installations at BAE Warton, Brize Norton, RAF Lossiemouth and Edinburgh-Turnhouse. They were shown the Eurofighter. Again pains were taken to avoid offending the visitors. No public statements were made about China’s human rights record, nor did the delegation take part in any press conference. Any possibility of awkward questioning or embarrassment was strictly prevented.7

The same concilliatory attitude was shown to China in the treatment extended to Chinese pro-democracy activist and former Prisoner of Conscience Wei Jingsheng when he visited the UK. Wei Jingsheng accused Robin Cook of being “two faced” after the Foreign Secretary cancelled planned photo calls and the Foreign Office tried to prevent him (Wei Jinsheng) from meeting the press. He criticised the UK’s decision to lead the EU in not supporting a UN resolution on China’s appalling human rights record at the annual meeting of the United Nations Commission. This government is the first to not support such a resolution since Tiananmen Square in 1989 and has promoted the move as part of a policy of dialogue instead of criticism. Wei Jingsheng spoke for many when he accused the UK of greed and cowardice in its policy of appeasement towards China. He said that the Chinese regime will respond to public pressure not the UK’s policy of private ‘engagement’.8

The Embargo

The EU introduced a ban on arms sales to China on 26th June 1989, but the scope of that ban was left for national interpretation. The UK interprets this ban to cover: “lethal weapons such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets, and missiles; specially designed components of the above, and ammunition; military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms; any equipment which is liable to lead to internal repression.”9

This interpretation of the terms of the ban did not cover most of the equipment that the UK was, and is, actually exporting to China. Within months of the imposition of the embargo, GEC-Marconi was allowed to go ahead with a £30 million sale of “head-up displays” and radar equipment for Chinese fighters on the grounds that these were “avionics, not arms”.10

This effectively negated the message of disapproval intended by the embargo. Continuing sales (some in violation of even the UK’s own interpretataion of the ban) and through growing military links between the UK and China exposed further the token nature of the UK embargo. As Wei Jingsheng warns, the Chinese themselves view these developing links as the true indicator of the UK’s attitude to China. They dismiss the embargo as a sop to western public opinion, worded and implemented by successive UK governments to allow their companies to continue to provide China with the electronics needed to equip its indigenous and Russian-supplied weaponry.

UK arms exports to China

The equipment licensed for export to China has included airborne and ground based radar, military aerospace components, range finders, surveillance equipment, laser sighting and targetting equipment, military electronics, communications and navigation equipment. Military demolitions explosives, other military explosives and test equipment for small arms ammunition were also licensed. Since May 1997 there have been 112 military licences granted to China. In 1999 the total value of the equipment licensed for export to China was £42,000,000.11

These are significant exports. China is building up military forces, particularly naval, for potential use in an assault on Taiwan, or on Taiwanese territories.12 Aerospace components, electronics, radar, communications and surveillance equipment and new design ideas could all easily be an integral part of the development of China’s forces, particularly naval and amphibious, to the point that they feel able to launch that assault. Analysts suggest that China’s hesitancy over an invasion of Taiwan has been primarily because of the US support of the Taiwanese with high tech weaponry. Israel recently shelved planned sales of radar to China after pressure from the US fearing precisely that they would be effective in use against Taiwan.13 The arms race across the Taiwan Strait has escalated in recent years and has been described as “unprecedented since World War II”.14

Observers believe that China may be holding back from invasion in part to consolidate its military superiority over Taiwan. Beijing continues to purchase aircraft carriers and jets to develop a naval force with the desired capabilities for invasion. A number of incidents in the Taiwan Strait, including Chinese naval exercises, have escalated tensions. Taiwan has responded with pleas to the US for aid and more arms supplies. Most recently they released a document outlining scenarios for potential Chinese invasion strategies including a terrifying ‘missile saturation’ assault.15 The UK’s Annual Reports on Strategic Export Controls do not, currently, give enough detail about the individual licences to allow informed comment as to whether or not exports from the UK would assist China in the development of missile technology or weapons of mass destruction.

The Italian helicopter manufacturer Agusta (now merging with UK company Westland) announced a licensed production deal with Chinese company AVIC at Farnborough International 2000. Reports allege that AVIC will produce the A109K2 helicopter for civil and military use and for use by Chinese police, as the older Agusta A109 Power has been. The helicopter will be produced in China, but the deal seems bound to benefit the new company Agusta Westland, 50% of which is owned by UK firm GKN. This is despite the fact that the UK’s interpretation of the EU embargo states that military helicopters should not be supplied to China9. The A109K2’s facility for ‘hot and high’ operations (high altitude and temperature)raises the question of where the Chinese will deploy it since the key high altitude region in China is Tibet16 .

Dual-use products (military products that also have non-military applications) are the subject of many of the UK licences granted. They are problematic for several reasons. Such exports endorse the regime buying them, undermining criticism of their actions and encouraging others to trade more freely. The long term effect of high tech, dual use exports may be to enable significant advances in China’s ability to develop its own high tech industry and high tech weapons.17 The application of dual use products can also be directly to the detriment of human rights. One infamous case of such an export was of traffic control systems used during the Tiananmen Square massacre to photograph protesters and help with police capture of dissenters. Licences have since been granted so that the same traffic control technology is now in use in Lhasa, Tibet. There is no traffic congestion in Lhasa.18

What should be done?

  1. The 1989 EU embargo should be reconfirmed as China fails to meet the criteria of European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, including: Criterion Two - respect of human rights; Criterion Four - preservation of regional peace, security and stability.
  2. The UK government should extend its interpretation of the embargo to cover all military goods and equipment including components.
  3. Delegations from China should not be invited to UK arms exhibitions, or to visit UK military companies or Ministry of Defence establishments.
  4. The UK should take the lead on getting a common interpretation of the EU embargo among European Union Member States to cover all military goods.

Notes

1. Janes Defence Weekly 15.3.00 and 12.7.00, Financial Times 7.3.00, actual spending estimate from IISS: The Military Balance, 1999-2000
2. Daily Telegraph 21.1.98 and Financial Times 6.9.98
3. The Guardian 18.3.00
4. Hansard 13.11.97
5. Hansard 26.4.99
6. Daily Telegraph, 14.1.00
7. The Times 10.1.00 and Air Forces Monthly 4.8.00
8. Independent 22.4.98 and 12.3.98, The Times 13.3.98, Daily Telegraph 12.3.98
9. Hansard 3.6.98
10. Jane’s Defence Weekly 23.9.89
11. Strategic Export Control Annual Review 1997-1999
12. Janes Defence Weekly 22.12.99
13. Air Forces Monthly Sept. 2000
14. The Times 23.2.00
15. Janes Defence Weekly 16.8.00
16. Flight Daily News (Farnborough 2000) 27.7.00
17. Air forces Monthly Sept. 2000
18. Amnesty International cited in M Phythian - The Politics of British Arms Sales 1964-1999, Manchester University Press, 2000

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