CAAT - Ballistic Missile Defense submission

The key issues for Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) regarding the UK's initial involvement in the United States (US) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) programme are: the inevitable creep into full involvement; the offensive potential of a US BMD system; missile proliferation; the lack of accountability; and wasted resources. Underlying these issues is the fundamental question of the UK Government's motivation for BMD involvement. CAAT considers that the two main motivations are a) the desire to be the US's key partner and b) to benefit UK-based military industry. The key issues and motivations are considered below.

Level of UK Involvement

The request to upgrade Fylingdales cannot be separated from the BMD programme as a whole. Once the Government has agreed to UK involvement and ridden the inconvenient questions and publicity involved in taking this initial step, it is inconceivable that future requests by the US would be turned down. The use of Menwith Hill to relay BMD data and the construction of an X-band radar at Fylingdales are only the most obvious next steps. Reports that MoD defence officials see basing US interceptors in the UK as a 'natural development' indicate the manner in which momentum is likely to build.

The US BMD Programme - an offensive capacity

The US BMD programme has rapidly accelerated not because of a change in the international situation but because the US Administration changed. The hawkish Bush Administration, closely allied to the arms industry, rejected earlier security assessments and made a priority of BMD. The programme has now been set free to go where it will, with rapidly expanding budgets and reduced congressional oversight. Indeed, the US Administration seems willing to field whatever the companies produce. In December 2002, George Bush announced that 10 interceptor missiles will be deployed to Alaska during 2004, this less than a week after the failure of the most recent test! Either the Administration has extraordinary faith or the effectiveness of the system is not the prime consideration.

Once a US Administration has confidence in an operational BMD system, it would gain the freedom to intervene where it might not otherwise have been able to. The US is explicit that it requires this freedom.

The weapons technology that is being developed for BMD - sensors, missiles, high-power lasers etc. - clearly have significant offensive potential. It would be unrealistic to expect a country so willing to intervene around the world and strike within sovereign countries, not to actively pursue a global sword in parallel with a global 'shield'.

The inevitable next step is for BMD to move into space. This is most obvious in the form of the anticipated space-based laser. The US has stated that its armed forces should have 'full spectrum dominance' which includes 'access to and freedom to operate in all domains - space, sea, land, air and information.'

Missile Proliferation

There is a wide range of mechanisms for attempting to address the issue of arms proliferation: from diplomacy and arms control agreements to a willingness to address the 'causes' of potential conflict and hostility. However, if significant resources are not forthcoming for these mechanisms or other, militaristic, actions dominate the agenda, it is unrealistic to expect peaceful solutions. Whatever agreements are signed, BMD cannot be said to be complementing arms control if it requires the end of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and leads to vast sums being spent around the world on missiles and their guidance systems. (It is striking how the ABM Treaty went from being 'a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons' in 2000, to an irrelevance in 2002.)

The UK Government claims that while many feared that there would be a post-ABM Treaty arms race, 'this has not happened.' While this would be a very happy situation, it unfortunately appears to be a highly optimistic reading of recent developments. Whether the cause is BMD or US rhetoric, North Korea appears to be speeding up and expanding its development of nuclear weapons. Talk of sales of interceptors to India (see paragraph 10) or of potential US-Indian BMD co-operation must also cause concern to even the most optimistic government minister. It is clearly impossible to consider Indian capability in isolation from Pakistan and China.

Spending several hundred billion dollars on missiles and their guidance systems is a perverse way to seek to address global missile proliferation. The US is already working collaboratively with European states, Japan and Israel on BMD systems and the list of countries that receive US-developed missile technology is certain to grow.

The Arrow BMD system is a case in point. It was developed collaboratively by Israel and the US, and Israel is now keen to market the system. It has held talks with Turkey, and an Indian MoD official has stated that Israel has no objection to sales to India. The US has yet to authorise exports, but if it does there are expectations that sales of the system over the next ten years would amount to $600 million to $900 million. Raytheon has reacted to these potential sales by claiming that they could jeopardise exports of PAC-3 and THAAD systems and (in an very uncharacteristic complaint from a major arms company) 'undercut the integrity' of the Missile Technology Control Regime.

While the new International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation is welcome, its provisions are weaker than those of the Missile Technology Control Regime (presumably to persuade more states to sign up). More importantly, it is undermined by the actions of, amongst others, the US and UK. While the nuclear powers retain and extend their nuclear capability and delivery systems and throw money at other potentially offensive systems, it is naive to think that other states will somehow decide they should be rejecting such instruments.

Accountability

The process leading to Secretary of State of Defence Geoff Hoon's 'preliminary conclusion that the answer to the US request must be yes' is a disgrace. For months ministers have refused to respond to questions about Fylingdales and Menwith Hill, whilst making increasingly positive noises about the US BMD system. To produce a consultation paper a week before the US request to use Fylingdales and then to all intents and purposes say 'yes' before a chance for debate and a Defence Committee report, is blatant manipulation of the process. It is sad that the 'consultation' appears to be only a charade, it is possibly even sadder that the government does not mind this being obvious.

Wasted Resources

US spending on BMD programmes is presently around $8 billion per year. This has increased significantly since the Bush Administration came to power, and is set to increase further. A recent report by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and Economists Allied for Arms Reduction estimates the costs of a layered BMD system at between $800 billion and $1,200 billion through to 2035. As the UK gets drawn further into the project it will undoubtedly be expected to pick up a proportion of the bill for the 'cover' it receives.

UK Motivation - the desire to be the US's key partner

The relationship between UK and US leaders is a broad subject and is essentially beyond the scope of this submission, except to say that personal factors often appear to be ignored when analysing matters of state. The relevance of politicians enjoying strutting the world stage and making bellicose statements should not be ignored.

UK Motivation - contracts for UK-based military industry

The UK has not identified an 'immediate significant ballistic missile threat to the UK', however it has identified an 'opportunity for UK industry to reap the benefits of participation' in the BMD programme.

At the Farnborough airshow/arms fair in July 2002, Boeing announced BMD tie-ups with BAE Systems, EADS and Alenia Spazio. Boeing and BAE Systems signed a memorandum of understanding to 'support all aspects of global ballistic missile defence'. The BAE Systems group marketing director said the deal was the 'culmination of 12-18 months of talks' but warned there was as yet 'little detail'. BAE Systems and Boeing officials made it clear that 'the key to meaningful European industrial participation is national government commitment to a missile defence program.' Companies are not going to receive lucrative BMD contracts if their governments do not sign up to BMD. Boeing is not interested in the technical ability of European companies (of which there is little compared to the experienced US giants). It was directed by the US Administration to sign up partners in order to bring other governments on board. In November 2002 Defense News suggested that, despite hard-pressed military budgets, the 'message' from industry was producing 'initial signs of movement.'

The direct link between company interests and the foreign policy of major arms producing countries appears to be illustrated in the recent NATO decision to initiate a new BMD study rather than extend the scope of an existing one. France had blocked a US proposal to extend the original study even though the other NATO members backed it. However, once it was agreed that a new study would be launched, even with the same aims, France was suddenly behind the idea. Thales, a French-based company, had lost out in the award of the original study and an 'industrial source' speculated to Jane's Defence Weekly that the chance of getting Thales back into the programme may have helped motivate France's change in position. It is difficult to think of an alternative credible interpretation.

Summary

CAAT considers that the upgrade of Fylingdales cannot be considered in isolation from the BMD programme as a whole. It considers that those evaluating any aspect of the programme should look beyond the argument that it is a 'Defense'; to fail to give full weight to the offensive aspects to the programme provides an inaccurate context, as does the failure to see company interests as an active motivation for the project.

There appears little doubt that BMD will increase missile proliferation and it is disingenuous for the Government to suggest otherwise. It is also disingenuous for it to claim that a genuine consultation is taking place. CAAT considers that the decision for the UK to become involved in the BMD programme is an inevitable result of Ministers' perceptions of the priority of relationships with the US and military industry.

Submission from the Campaign Against Arms Trade to the Defence Committee's inquiry into 'Ballistic Missile Defense'