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Submission from the Campaign Against Arms Trade to the Foreign Affairs Committee's Inquiry into the United Kingdom's relations with Turkey, with reference to Turkey's role in European defence structures and its prospects for accession to the European Union
The Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) is opposed to all military exports, but recognises that, despite its negative effects on human rights, security and the economy, the arms trade will not end overnight. As an interim measure, therefore, CAAT is seeking an export licensing policy with an emphasis on restraint, especially on exports to governments which violate human rights or to countries in areas of conflict. This leads CAAT to focus its campaigning on sales to particular countries, one of them being Turkey. The leading role of the armed forces within Turkish society and government; its occupation of northern Cyprus in 1974; its long established military rivalry with Greece, notwithstanding their mutual membership of NATO; its poor record on human rights, and its harsh treatment of the Kurdish people who live within its boundaries, and, indeed, over the Iraqi border, are well documented. They will, no doubt, be the subject of submissions by organisations better qualified to comment on them than ours. The UK government considers military export licence applications against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. Amongst the eight criteria are Criterion Two which covers "The respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination"; Criterion Three "The internal situation in the country of final destination as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts"; and Criterion Four "Preservation of regional peace, security and stability". Sales to Turkey do not meet these criteria. CAAT believes that Turkey's strategic geographical position, situated between Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, as well as, historically, the Soviet Union, has led the UK and other western governments to overlook its negative attributes when considering military relations. Through its military collaboration, the UK is giving Turkey's military a respectability it does not deserve, and undermining those working for justice and human rights. Some of the UK-supplied equipment is directly used in human rights abuses. For instance, the Akrep vehicle, produced locally in Turkey under licence from the UK company Landrover, saw service against the Kurdish people in northern Iraq. (Independent on Sunday, 25.6.95) Turkey's military links with Israel, cemented by arms industry co-operation and military training pacts in 1996, are seen as threatening by other countries in the region, particularly Syria. These ties have also been seen as a way for Turkey to circumvent the restrictions that the United States and some European countries, such as Germany, have from time to time imposed. (Progressive magazine, December 1998)
According to the United States' Department of Defense's "Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense", March 2001, Turkey's military expenditure as a proportion of GDP rose during the 1990's whilst that of most NATO member countries fell. Military spending as % of GDP
Additionally, arms procurement benefits from monies the Turkish Defence Industries Undersecretariat (SSM) receives from the Defence Industry Support Fund. Since 1985 this Fund has received revenue generated by the imposition of a luxury tax on alcohol, tobacco, petrol and gambling, together with a small percentage of the interest earned on all Turkish Lira bank accounts. This Fund has also been hit by the downturn in the economy, receiving $500 million in 2001 against an anticipated $1 billion. It expects to receive $700 million in 2002. (Jane's Defence Weekly, 9.1.02)
In the mid-1980s Turkey started to establish a huge military-industrial complex and to purchase sophisticated military hardware. The Turkish government wanted to modernise and re-equip the country's armed forces and to lessen their dependence on military imports. Since then, many of Turkey's military contracts have been co-production deals with foreign investments in local companies averaging $300 million annually. (Jane's Defence Weekly, 28.2.01) A model for these was the $4.5 billion "Peace Onyx" programme agreed in 1983. Under the programme, 160 General Dynamics F-16s were to be built under licence in Turkey. A joint US/Turkish company, Turkish Aerospace Industries, employing 1,600 staff, was set up on a site at Murted. General Dynamics transferred aircraft manufacturing know-how and set up management systems, whilst the labour was primarily indigenous. (Flight International, 15.7.89) Such deals continue. Turkey hopes to obtain work for local industry in respect of the $200 billion Joint Strike Fighter programme in return for a contribution of $1 billion towards the fighter's development. (Defense News, 5-11.11.01) The desire to develop a Turkish arms industry has sometimes been said by the military to be responsible for procurement delays. In the face of such criticism, a SSM official reaffirmed the priorities: "In our contract negotiations with foreign defence companies, the SSM always seeks to maximise local industry input, offsets, and technology transfer". (Defense News, 10-16.12.01)
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the UK was the fifth largest supplier of major conventional weapons to Turkey between 1996 and 2000, accounting for just over 1% of the total:
The UK government's Annual Reports on Strategic Export Controls, which includes all military goods, gives the following figures for exports to Turkey. Military equipment deliveries identifiable under EC Tariff Codes in given year:
MKEK and the manufacture of sub-machine guns Turkey ordered 200,000 HK33 5.6mm assault rifles from Heckler & Koch, a German subsidiary of BAE Systems' Royal Ordnance subsidiary in January 1998. Assembly of these rifles took place at a factory run by MKEK near Ankara. In October 1998 the number ordered rose to 500,000 despite serious concerns of the rifles being used for internal repression by the Turkish military. In July 1998, the Turkish news agency Anadolu reported that 500 Heckler & Koch MP5 sub-machine guns produced under licence were to be exported to the Indonesian Police which has a record of human rights abuses and extrajudicial killing. This deal came a few months after licences for the direct export of the guns from the UK were refused. MP5 machine-guns are also used by the Indonesian Special Forces KOPASSUS. ("Running Guns", Zed Books, 2000) Matra BAe Dynamics and the sale of Rapier surface-to-air missiles Matra BAe Marconi Space Racal Landrover and Otokar Airbus Military Transport Aircraft Alvis armoured vehicles Joint Production Memorandum Export Credits
As of 11th July 2001, the outstanding exposure on ECGD guarantees for military equipment to Turkey was £267 million. (Hansard, 20.7.01) Although full information about projects supported by the export credits is not in the public domain, both the Landrover supplies to Otokar (Hansard, 5.4.00) and the air defence missiles (Hansard, 27.1.00) received ECGD cover. UK training
UK visits to Turkey "Blind Eye"
EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports The "Six-Nation" Framework Agreement Star 21 As with the Framework Agreement, CAAT is worried that STAR 21 proposals may lead to weaker export controls at national level, a disquiet that would be magnified if the European Union expanded to include states such as Turkey. It is essential that the debate on these issues allows for substantial input by parliamentarians, national and European, as well as by interested civil society groups.
Turkey's human rights record and the influence of the military in Turkish society need to be addressed before Turkey becomes an EU member state. These moral implications are of utmost importance, but there are financial ones too. The country has major economic difficulties yet the cuts elsewhere in the budget are greater than those in military spending There is obvious distortion of the economy by the Turkish military and EU citizens should not be expected to financially underwrite it. The lack of democratic input into European foreign and security policies in general, and the integration of military industry in particular, would almost certainly be exacerbated if Turkey were to join the European Union. As Turkey clearly fails to meet the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, the UK government should impose an embargo to cover all goods needing a licence under Part III of Schedule 1 to the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1994. It should encourage the other EU states to do likewise. January 2002 |