Zimbabwe 0900

UK Arms Exports to Zimbabwe

By Emily Mitchell

The events of early 2000 threw the country’s troubles into such sharp relief that even the usually somnolent western media could no longer ignore the situation. The referendum that resoundingly rejected the government’s draft constitution, the burgeoning opposition to the ruling ZANU party, the land seizures by government supporters, the refusal of the authorities to evict the squatters, the intimidation primarily by government supporters during the elections and the potential two years of uncertainty before Presidential elections, all suggest that Zimbabwe is on the brink of immense change. After 20 years in power, Robert Mugabe seems to be losing control.

Mr Mugabe is President of a country in which half of the adult population is unemployed and inflation is soaring. The average Zimbabwean is poorer now in real terms than at independence in 1980 (The Economist 8.5.2000). A disastrous combination of drought, a failed IMF structural adjustment programme and high ‘defence’ spending have all contributed to the economic breakdown. Mugabe’s prosecution of an aggressive war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continues in the face of criticism from home and abroad. The army is profiting directly from the intervention in the DRC and the military establishment is consolidating its power and threatens democratic government.

Despite all this, until May 2000 the UK government chose to continue to export high-technology munitions to the Zimbabwean government. This report attempts to present the arguments against renewing arms exports to Zimbabwe. The arguments demonstrate how exports would be contrary to a responsible foreign policy and how the granting of licences would contravene both UK guidelines and the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, of which the UK is a signatory.

In 1965, Ian Smith, leader of the Rhodesian Front (RF), declared the country, then called Southern Rhodesia, independent in order to maintain white minority rule. The declaration contravened British colonial authority and was not recognised internationally. Rhodesia became an outcast and, like South Africa under apartheid, the RF government was subject to economic sanctions by the UN.

Following a split in 1963, there were two main African nationalist movements: Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwean African People’s Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo, then in exile in Tanzania. ZANU/ZAPU were defined partly, though not entirely, on ethnic grounds, with ZAPU being strongest among the Ndebele minority and ZANU a Shona movement. Through the years of white minority rule, nationalists gradually escalated their armed struggle, from a bombing campaign against key elements of the infrastructure in 1963-4, to guerrilla warfare based in neighbouring Mozambique.

The history of the arms trade to Zimbabwe reflects political developments in the country and the region, but also a changing international context. Prior to independence in 1980, trade was defined by the imperatives of the Cold War. Though western countries officially did not trade with either side in the conflict, the RF government received a steady supply of essential materials, including the armaments with which to prosecute the war, and found markets for its own exports through clandestine trade with South Africa and with private companies using South Africa as an intermediary. UK-owned oil came to Rhodesia from South Africa and US companies bought chrome from the Rhodesian government. UK arms companies violated UN sanctions and sold aircraft and other armaments to Rhodesia throughout the conflict (Peoples News Service 30.10.1979). In 1974 the RF government received 41 Centurion Tanks from Jordan via South Africa. In 1976, Ian Smith declared that Henry Kissinger had promised US support for his government, though this was subsequently denied by the White House.

The nationalist guerrillas, by the fact of their opposition to colonialism, received most of their support from countries aligned with China and the Soviet Union, including independent African states with socialist regimes. The USSR backed Nkomo, so China backed Mugabe (Army equipment is still mostly Chinese). Early on in the conflict, in 1966, ZIPRA guerrillas (the military wing of ZAPU) and ZANLA guerrillas (the military wing of ZANU) received training from Egypt and China. The Mozambiquan pro-independence guerrillas, Frelimo, also gave Zimbabwean fighters the training necessary to conduct a protracted struggle when it became apparent that Zimbabwean majority rule would require a long war. In 1976 they received Russian-made rocket launchers from Tanzania. East German training for ZANU fighters was expanded in 1979, when the Russians also provided artillery and surface-to-air missiles. Other countries which sent military aid or provided training included Romania, Cuba, Algeria and Yugoslavia.

Against the trend of Western support for Rhodesia and Eastern-bloc support for the nationalists, it should be noted that the Scandinavian countries assisted the Zimbabwean guerrillas, though this consisted mostly of humanitarian and medical supplies (Seidman, Martin and Johnson 1982). The Thatcher government came to power in the UK in 1979 with the intention of recognising a power sharing arrangement between the Rhodesian Front and Rev. Muzorewa, one of the few black politicians who would work with them. Only economic pressure from Nigeria convinced the UK that a government which included Ian Smith would not be politically viable. The following year, after almost 15 years of bitterly-fought guerilla war, majority rule was secured and Zimbabwe was officially accepted as an independent nation state. At independence, there were still thousands of combatants to disarm and reintegrate into peacetime society. The years of war left the country saturated with weapons.

The legacies of the period of illegal white rule and armed resistance continue to influence Zimbabwean political and military affairs to the present day. The current military and political elite contains many veterans of the independence struggle, including the country’s leader (first Prime Minister and then President) since independence, Robert Mugabe. Contemporary political divisions have their origins in the 1963 nationalist movement split. This split also gave birth to civil unrest in Matabeleland after independence. This continued well into the 1980s, stunting the economy and breeding distrust of the newly formed national army among civilians.

ZANU won the country’s first elections and came to power with Canaan Banana as President and Robert Mugabe as Prime Minister. The new government took a conciliatory approach to the status quo both within its own country and internationally. It did not seize the assets of wealthy settlers as white Rhodesians had feared. Mugabe pledged to honour all debts and loans of the previous regime, except those owed specifically for the munitions of the Rhodesian army. The ex-combatants had to be disarmed and retired in huge numbers and the new national army formed out of those remaining.

Arms Sales

In March 1980, the UK agreed to provide £75 million in training and aid to the Zimbabwean army. That same year, Mugabe turned down a deal for Soviet-built hardware that had been brokered by Joshua Nkomo, declaring that he did not want to enter into the ongoing trade relationship of buying spares and hiring Soviet instructors that this purchase would necessitate (The Guardian 11.6.1980). The following year, British Aerospace sold eight Hawk Jets to Zimbabwe for £20 million, thus cementing the relationship and effectively bringing Zimbabwe ‘on side’ in the battle for influence over the developing world. The Zimbabwean military continued to buy UK planes throughout the 1980s, including six Hawker Hunters and additional Hawk jets to replace some which were destroyed in 1983 by arsonists. This arsenal was augmented in 1985 by the purchase of seven additional Hawks and 13 Hawker Hunters.

In the mid-eighties Zimbabwe received a large shipment of arms from Poland and other eastern bloc countries. It also negotiated with the Soviet Union for the purchase of MiG-29 fighters but, in 1987, turned down the deal. During 1987, the UK government offered Harrier and Hawk jets to Zimbabwe, possibly with the express intention, and certainly with the effect, of heading-off the deal with Moscow. Zimbabwe cancelled a further £400 million in orders for Soviet Union arms in 1992.

External and Internal Alignments

Mr Mugabe’s 1980 decisions regarding UK or Soviet arms purchases can be seen to have two distinct meanings, one primarily international and one of internal significance. Firstly, the decision to buy British and not to have a direct relationship with Moscow can, as indicated above, be viewed as a means of aligning Zimbabwe with the West. Mugabe’s statement suggested that the purchase of arms was not merely about the particular hardware acquired, but about the establishment of international relationships.

The second way in which this event was indicative of broader trends lay in Mugabe’s rejection of Joshua Nkomo as a legitimate leader in the new administration. Increasingly the members of ZAPU felt disenfranchised by the ZANU government. The ZANU decision to stand alone for the general election rather than on a joint ticket with ZAPU came as a shock to many from ZAPU who had worked alongside ZANU during the war of independence. Those who had trained and fought for ZIPRA felt under-represented in the army. When a special presidential guard, the 5th Brigade, was trained by North Korea, Mugabe stated that one of its purposes would be to counteract ‘dissidents’, obliquely referring to the growing unrest among ex-ZIPRA fighters and their leaders (The Times 30.10.1981). Mugabe accused Nkomo and ZAPU of plotting to undermine the new government and the discovery of stored armaments on ZAPU property in 1982 seemed to confirm this. There followed a campaign of anti-government guerilla activity between 1982 and 1987 in Matabeleland. A small number of ex-ZIPRA guerrillas took up arms again, now against their former allies. There is some evidence that tensions between the nationalist groups was exacerbated by South African operatives deliberately attempting to destabilize the new nation. But while some of the dissidents were supported by South African arms, many ex-ZIPRA guerrillas were persecuted in the national army (the ZNA), and felt they had been driven to take up arms in defence of their lives.

The ZNA dealt with the uprising in much the same manner that the Rhodesian army had dealt with them when they were guerrillas. The 5th Brigade of the ZNA engaged in indiscriminate intimidation and killing of civilians in the areas where the dissidents were thought to be active. There was a total suspension of civil rights in these areas and as complete as possible news blackout over the entire situation. These events continue to be significant because they established a precedent in Zimbabwe for large-scale internal repression by the security services. This has been borne out in the army’s subsequent responses to civil protest and to the members of the press who report civil rights violations.

The Military Burden

From the outset, Zimbabwe had a very large military establishment for a country of its size, with 15% of the budget devoted to military spending and 60,000 personnel (Jane’s World Armies, May 1998). The current figure for personnel is 40,000, compared to 5,000-22,000 for other Sub-Saharan African countries of similar populations, excluding Angola (International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 1999). This military emphasis suggests that the ZNA has burdened the developing economy and arms purchases have soaked up large amounts of public money. Despite this, Zimbabwe did manage to achieve dynamic economic growth during years of relative peace in the mid-nineteen nineties. However, implementation of an IMF structural adjustment programme failed to deliver economic stability and growth, and bad droughts coupled with recession in the West meant that the promise of prosperity was short lived. Recent years have seen a combination of worsening economic conditions and escalating military involvement in the conflict in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo. Once again the country’s future looks precarious.

The conflict in the DRC has been called Africa’s first continental conflict as it has gradually drawn countries from all over the continent into its labyrinth of alliances.

In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide of 1994, many of the Hutu militiamen, the interahamwe, escaped into then-Zaire and fought alongside the rebels of the Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire, led by Laurent Kabila, in return for being allowed to remain. Kabila’s 1997 rise to power in Zaire (which then became the Democratic Republic of the Congo) is therefore necessarily linked to the ousted Rwandan regime which orchestrated the 1994 massacre. Rwanda, now under RPF leadership, and Uganda are fighting on the side of Congolese rebel movements against Kabila. Angola, Chad, Namibia and Zimbabwe are actively involved in supporting the current DRC regime. Kabila has no substantial army of his own and is dependent upon the involvement of outside armies for his political survival (BBC Online 23.6.1999).

Zimbabwe’s Current Involvement in the DRC Conflict

Zimbabwe has been involved in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since the mid-1990s in support of the Kabila regime. Though the government denies it, it is known that Zimbabwe sent a steady supply of stockpiled North Korean weapons to Kabila’s rebels before they came to power. Zimbabwe has been openly involved in the conflict since Kabila ousted the former dictator Mobuto Sese Seko in 1997 (Jane’s World Armies, May 1998).

At the end of 1999, Zimbabwe had an estimated 11,000 troops fighting in the Congo and had incurred losses of close to $200 million-worth of equipment since the start of the conflict (BBC Online 1.10.1999 and 25.11.1999. Also see CAAT report ‘Small Arms and Africa’). The Zimbabwean government estimates the cost of this involvement at $3 million per month. This is a price that the country, in the midst of a gruelling recession with unemployment above 50% and inflation running at around 57% (The Guardian 21.1.2000), can ill afford. In summer 1999, Zimbabwe defaulted on its loans from the IMF, and the IMF initially suspended an emergency loan of $193 million because of evidence that Zimbabwe was stepping up its involvement in Congo (BBC Online 4.10.1999). There has also been tension over internal Zimbabwean government documents which estimate the cost of the war at around $27 million-per-month – nine times the $3 million-per-month cost publicly declared to the IMF – though the government has described this as a mistake made in converting Zim-dollars into US dollars.

In order to meet the costs of the conflict, the army has set up self-administered commercial operations in the DRC. For services rendered, the Kabila regime ceded Zimbabwe the rights to a variety of economic concerns in Congo, including half a million acres of farmland, and copper, gold and diamond mines. But while the army declares that it is doing this so as to prevent its operations in Congo being a burden on the Zimbabwean treasury, the outcome is that ‘generals, political allies and relatives have made small fortunes’ (The Guardian 20.1.2000a). The possession by the army of these lucrative enterprises had led to speculation about the likelihood of a coup or other destabilising events resulting from top-heavy military power and wealth (The Guardian 20.1.2000a).

Possibilities for Resolution of the DRC Conflict

In July 1999, the Zambian government brokered a ceasefire agreement, known as the Lusaka accords, which was signed by Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe. It made provision for the UN and the Organisation for African Unity to constitute and deploy an appropriate peacekeeping force; the parties in the conflict were to be responsible for setting up a Joint Military Commission to conduct peacekeeping operations until the UN force could be deployed. In November, with almost all the provisions of the agreement unmet, the UN Secretary General recommended that the mandate of the ceasefire be extended until 15 January 2000. In February 2000 the UN authorised a 5,500 strong UN peacekeeping force, but continued failure to secure adequate security and cooperation guarantees meant that there was still no deployment by August.

The continuing presence of foreign forces in DRC has been widely condemned by the international community. The United Nations Security Council, in a resolution passed in April 1999, called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the country. Their presence, in contravention of the Lusaka accords, stymies any movement forward in the peace process and complicates all attempts to resolve this conflict.

Even during the Zimbabwean elections in June 2000, Kabila was meeting President Mugabe and Sam Nujoma, the President of Namibia. Following the summit, Kabila indicated that foreign troops would remain in the country as long as there was a military threat to his government (BBC Online 25.6.2000).

Following Zimbabwe’s intervention in the DRC in August 1998, there was, according to Foreign Office Minister Peter Hain, a ‘very clear change of policy’ regarding the licensing of equipment for ‘aggressive ends’ (Quadripartite Committee 17.7.2000). However, there was no formal or informal embargo, and licences for components for military goods continued to be granted. The DRC conflict dragged on, and in June 1999 the Presidency of the EU issued a Declaration committing Members States to ‘rigorous application’ of the EU Code of Conduct regarding the region. Again, there did not appear to be any substantial change in UK arms export policy (Quadripartite Committee 17.7.2000).

In January 2000, The Guardian broke the news that Prime Minister Tony Blair had pushed through licences for controversial arms sales to Zimbabwe (The Guardian 20.1.2000c). Mr Blair determined, against public opinion and the recommendation of his own Foreign Secretary, that British Aerospace could sell spare parts for Hawk fighter jets to the Zimbabwean government. On 24th February 2000, the government duly announced that seven licence applications for Hawk spares would be granted.

It was well known that Hawk fighter jets had been, and could again be, used for bombing raids in the DRC Conflict. Regardless of the presence or lack of an arms embargo on Zimbabwe, the licensing of Hawk spares blatantly contravened both UK and EU guidelines. Tony Blair argued that the UK had commercial obligations to fulfil a contract originating before the Labour government came to power, however, these obligations could have been overridden by a ministerial licensing decision (Quadripartite Committee 17.7.2000). Business interests appeared to be the determining factor for government policy.

On 3rd May 2000, Robin Cook announced that the UK government would ‘refuse all new licence applications for exports of arms and military equipment to Zimbabwe’, and that this would ‘include all licences for spare parts in connection with previous contracts’ (Hansard 3.5.2000, col 150). He also reported that the Secretary of State for International Development had suspended the department’s support for Land Rovers for the Zimbabwean police, halting the supply of the remaining 450 vehicles. Nine days later Mr Cook announced that all extant licences would be revoked (Hansard 12.5.2000, col 493). Of the seven Hawk spares licences granted in February, most of the goods of one licence had been exported and approximately 20% of another. The other five were returned unused (Quadripartite Committee 17.7.2000).

Important questions need to be asked about what changed between January and May 2000 that caused contractual obligations, which had been so compelling before, to vanish into thin air. Certainly, civil unrest during early 2000 escalated to the point that even members of the elite began to be affected by it, notably white landowners whose farms were illegally squatted by Mugabe’s supporters. Presumably this, or the media storm associated with it, provided the motivation for an embargo that civilian lives in the DRC could not.

There is no reason why a similar sequence of events should not happen again, though next time it might pass unnoticed. The Quadripartite Committee (a joint committee consisting of the Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry committees) suggested that, but for a leak, the issue might not have become known until the end of 2001. To address this lack of transparency it proposed that a system of prior scrutiny of arms export licences, operated by the Quadripartite Committee, should be ‘put in place forthwith’.

It is laudable that the UK government finally decided to stop granting export licences to UK firms to sell arms to Zimbabwe, even though it was extremely late. The following analysis provides reasons why the UK in particular, and the West in general, should continue this embargo.

Destabilization of Central and Southern Africa
Zimbabwe is currently involved in an illegal war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a war in which the presence of foreign troops has been condemned by the UN Security Council and Secretary General. The continued active presence of 13,000 Zimbabwean troops (The Observer 6.8.2000) also goes against the Lusaka accords of which Zimbabwe is a signatory and which call for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the DRC.
This activity should prohibit arms exports under both UK and EU guidelines. The UK government’s ‘Criteria used in considering conventional Arms Export Licence Applications’ state that ‘The need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way’ will be considered, and that ‘The Government will not issue an export licence if there is a clearly identifiable risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against another country’. The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports specifies in criterion 4 that countries exporting arms must account for the preservation of regional peace and stability when they grant export licences (Department of Trade and Industry, March 1999).
In addition to issues concerning the present stage of the DRC conflict, Zimbabwe has also been accused by the United Nations of illegally exporting landmines and of supplying arms to Laurent Kabila’s forces while he was in opposition, though the government denies this (Jane’s World Armies, May 1998). Zimbabwe’s participation in the war in the DRC clearly makes it a country ineligible to receive arms from the UK or other EU member states.

Lack of respect for human rights
The UK Criteria also state that ‘The Government will take into account respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the recipient country’, just as criterion 2 of the EU Code of Conduct states that ‘the respect of human rights in the country of final destination’ is a necessary condition for granting arms export licenses. Internal human rights abuses, including a shoot to kill policy used against demonstrators resulting in at least ten deaths, the use of leg-irons in prisons and the arrest and torture of journalists (Amnesty International, 1999, p 370), mean Zimbabwe should be ineligible for arms exports from the UK or other EU countries.

A potentially unstable internal situation, with the military gaining unprecedented executive power
Zimbabwe has always laboured under the burden of a large military establishment, but recently the power of the military establishment has increased in some alarming ways. The army is profiting directly from the lucrative business interests it now administers in the DRC as a result of its support for the Kabila government. While the official explanation is that this will absorb the cost of the war effort, it also functions as a way of consolidating military power separately from the civilian government. At a time when Zimbabwe is facing economic crisis and an approaching change in leadership, this growing army power must be viewed as dangerous, as well as corrupt self-interest.
In 1998, an attempted coup by the army was reported in Zimbabwe’s Standard newspaper. The army responded by kidnapping two journalists from the paper and torturing them. Mr Mugabe reacted by stating in a radio interview that he cannot be held responsible for the army’s treatment of journalists who spread ‘blatant lies’ which damage the nation. ‘I will not condemn my army for having done that when they are being provoked,’ he concluded (Media Institute of Southern Africa 28.1.2000). The possibility of a military take-over in Zimbabwe has loomed large enough on the horizon for the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office to circulate a report in January 2000 entitled ‘A Coup for Zimbabwe?’, written by Peter Longworth, the British High Commissioner to Harare (The Guardian 20.1.2000b).
The maintenance of democratic civilian rule in Zimbabwe is essential to the hopes of establishing peace and promoting growth in Southern Africa. The influx of arms to an unstable and rebellious military is not in line with the ideals of a responsible UK foreign policy.

The high cost to the Zimbabwean economy of present military spending Military spending
by Zimbabwe was 5% of GDP in 1998 – above the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (4.3%) and far above the IMF-recommended maximum of 2%. It is a ridiculously high figure for a country facing no external threat. The country is in the midst of its worst recession since independence with over 50% unemployment and inflation approaching 60%. With the World Bank and IMF seeking to impose strict public spending limits in return for economic assistance, the services most needed by the poor of this country are already under severe pressure, regardless of a war no one can afford to fight.
In August 1999 Shigemitsu Sugisaki, deputy director of the IMF said that ‘Directors (of the IMF) noted the risks that Zimbabwe’s military involvement in the DRC posed to fiscal and balance of payments performance, and the stabilisation [of the economy] ... ’ However, the war continues. Zimbabwe points to a promise by Kabila to defray the costs of their involvement in the war, but it is difficult to imagine this materialising in the near future (South African Business Day 4.8.1999).
The export of arms to an impoverished country whose government is pursuing an aggressive foreign war, can have no ethical excuse. What Zimbabwe sorely needs is assistance to heal the economy, support for national reconciliation and pressure for the regime to withdraw from its involvement in the DRC.

Alao, A., 1994, Brothers at War: Dissidence and Rebellion in Southern Africa, British Academic Press, London
Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1999, London
BBC Online, 23 June 1999, ‘DR Congo: What price peace?’
BBC Online, 7 July 1999, ‘Congo draft ceasefire agreed’,
BBC Online, 23 September 1999, ‘Zimbabwe army in Congo diamond deal’
BBC Online, 1 October 1999, ‘Zimbabwe accused of ‘economic colonialism’’
BBC Online, 4 October 1999, ‘Zimbabwe denies misleading IMF’
BBC Online, 25 November 1999, ‘Zimbabwe losses add up in Congo’
BBC Online, 25 June 2000, ‘Kabila says troops will stay’
CAAT, September 1999, Small Arms and Africa
Department of Trade and Industry, Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, March 1999, Strategic Export Controls Annual Report, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London
The Economist, 8 May 2000
Electronic Mail and Guardian, March 1997, ‘Report on the 1980’s disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands’, Compiled by Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe
The Financial Times, 17 February 2000, ‘Cracks across a continent: Robert Mugabe’s troubles in Zimbabwe threaten to add to the turmoil engulfing Africa’
The Guardian, 11 June 1980, ‘Mugabe rejects arms’ The Guardian, 20 January 2000a, ‘The General’s profit as the people pay with their lives’
The Guardian, 20 January 2000b, ‘Telegram exposes quest for personal gain in conflict’
The Guardian, 20 January 2000c, ‘Britain’s ethical foreign policy: keeping the Hawk jets in action’
The Guardian, 21 January 2000, ‘Britain accused of hypocrisy as war cripples economy’
International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 1999,The Military Balance 1999-2000,Oxford University Press
Jane’s World Airforces, Issue 4, November 1997
Jane’s World Armies, Issue 3, May 1998
Media Institute of Southern Africa, 28 January 2000, ‘President threatens journalists with arrest’
The Observer, 6 August 2000, ‘Mugable plan to kill opponents is foiled’
Peoples News Service, 30 October 1979, ‘Britain’s contribution to Rhodesia’s war effort: Part 3’
Quadripartite Committee, 17 July 2000, Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry committees’ report Strategic Export Controls: Further Report and Parliamentary Prior Scrutiny, The Stationery Office, London
Seidman, Martin and Johnson,1982, Zimbabwe: a new history, Zimbabwe Publishing House,
Harare South African Business Day, 4 August 1999, ‘Loan hungry Zimbabwe makes pledge to IMF’ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1999,
SIPRI Yearbook 1999, ‘Transfers of major conventional weapons’,
Oxford University Press The Times, 30 October 1981, ‘North Korean arms start flowing into Zimbabwe’
United Nations, 10 February 2000, Democratic Republic of the Congo - MONUC Mandate, UN Department of Public Information URL: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/monuc/monucM.htm
United Nations, 10 February 2000, Democratic Republic of the Congo - MONUC Background, UN Department of Public Information URL: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/monuc/monucB.htm
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World Bank, Structural Adjustment and Zimbabwe’s Poor, OED Precis, Operations Evaluation Department

DRC - Democratic Republic of the Congo
EU - European Union
IMF - International Monetary Fund
RF - Rhodesian Front
RPF - Rwandan Patriotic Front
UN - United Nations
ZANLA - military wing of ZANU
ZANU - Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU - Zimbabwean African People’s Union
ZIPRA - military wing of ZAPU
ZNA - Zimbabwean National Army

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